In a future full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea may resort to tactical nuclear strikes—estimated at yields between 2 and 5 kilotons—against South Korea’s forward-deployed armored forces stationed in Cheolwon, Yanggu, or Hongcheon. Such a strike would likely annihilate armored units in the vicinity, but its strategic aim would be to clear the way for a SOF-led, rapid hybrid warfare campaign. The notion of North Korea deploying tactical nukes is not implausible; the Atlantic Council’s report titled “A Rising Nuclear Double-Threat in East Asia: Insight from our Guardian Tiger I and II Tabletop Exercises” projects that North Korea’s tactical nuclear strikes would target South Korean naval fleet.
While the Guardian Tiger simulations emphasized attacks on the naval fleet, this article presents a broader, hypothetical escalation scenario involving tactical nuclear strikes on forward-deployed armored units and subsequent special operations incursions.
Layered Exploitation After a Nuclear Strike
This scenario could unfold through a series of sequential escalations, each designed to exploit operational chaos and psychological shock.
The initial step would involve launching drones equipped with thermal sensors within minutes of the nuclear detonation. These platforms would scan for survivors, civilian vehicles, and unarmored support elements—identifying both human and logistical targets amidst the blast zone.
Following this, North Korea would likely activate mobile electronic warfare platforms—possibly mounted on trucks or camouflaged as civilian vehicles—to jam GPS, disrupt radar systems, and interfere with encrypted communications. Such actions would sever command links between brigade headquarters and frontline units, crippling coordination of artillery fire and unmanned systems.
As surviving ROK armored units attempt to regroup under degraded conditions, they would become targets for ambushes employing FPV drones in tandem with man-portable anti-tank guided missiles. These swarm-based, precision engagements are modeled after Russian battlefield innovations seen in Ukraine, where drone-assisted ambushes inflicted heavy losses on mechanized formations. It is important to note that South Korea’s K1 tanks—which make up the majority of the country’s armored fleet—lack NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection systems. While upgraded variants such as the K1A1 and K1E1 tanks are expected to be gradually outfitted with NBC overpressure protection systems, the absence of such capabilities in most frontline units suggests that any area exposed to a tactical nuclear detonation would likely become inoperable for much of South Korea’s armored forces.
Simultaneously, North Korean SOF units could maneuver into nearby urban terrain—such as Hwacheon or Goseong—where they would prepare choke points, emplace booby traps, mine vital bridges, and use sniper-drone pairings to encircle retreating ROK forces. The result would be localized kill zones and mass confusion.
In a parallel axis of attack, disguised infiltrators—either pre-positioned or embedded under civilian cover—could strike rear-area targets, including fuel depots, logistics centers, and command posts in areas like Chuncheon or even the outskirts of Seoul. These actions would disrupt resupply operations and fracture higher-level decision-making structures.
As the final layer of this campaign, a full-scale information warfare operation would likely be launched. AI-generated deepfake footage of surrendering ROK units or fabricated U.S. withdrawal orders could flood social media to fracture public morale. Concurrent cyberattacks would paralyze transportation infrastructure and emergency response systems, deepening the sense of systemic collapse and spreading fear across civilian and military populations alike.
This concept of operations transcends Cold War-style infiltration. What emerges is a synchronized, real-time, and multi-dimensional approach aimed at inducing total systemic paralysis—militarily, logistically, and societally.
Implications for U.S. and ROK Forces
Combined U.S. forces and South Korean forces face a cluster of interrelated vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit in such a scenario.
A primary concern lies in the survivability of armored units. Even next-generation platforms like the K2 Black Panther tanks are vulnerable to FPV drone swarms and decentralized ATGM ambushes. These low-cost but lethal systems—refined through Russian combat experience in Ukraine—have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to neutralize high-end armor.
Another point of fragility is rear-area infrastructure. Urban corridors near Seoul, along with critical logistics arteries, remain attractive targets for SOF raids and sabotage. Disruptions in these areas could paralyze the mobility and resupply capacity of frontline forces.
The alliance’s heavy reliance on C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems introduces further strategic risk. These highly networked systems, while offering battlefield clarity, are increasingly brittle under prolonged electronic jamming or precision strikes—leaving command nodes isolated at key moments.
The psychological domain is also vulnerable. Disinformation campaigns leveraging deepfakes, fabricated narratives, and cyber-induced chaos could trigger panic, confusion among military units, or even political unrest if public trust in government and alliance leadership erodes.
Lastly, there is the issue of time sensitivity. Should North Korean SOF succeed in targeting strategic hubs like Osan Air Base or Camp Humphreys early in the conflict, reinforcement flows could be disrupted or delayed. This would leave forward units exposed during a window when rapid consolidation is critical. Recognizing that it cannot sustain a prolonged conflict against U.S.–ROK combined forces—particularly given that the bulk of U.S. reinforcements would arrive from the continental United States within 90 days—North Korea is likely to focus on maximizing gains during the initial phase of war. Its objective would be to seize a portion of South Korean territory (for instance, the northern outskirts of Seoul), then push for an armistice to solidify its territorial gains, effectively presenting the outcome as a fait accompli.
Policy Recommendations: Building Resilience
To effectively counter this evolving threat landscape, U.S. and South Korean policymakers, along with military planners, should adopt a comprehensive set of strategic and operational measures.
First, drone warfare integration must be prioritized. This includes deploying counter-FPV drone systems and hardened ISR platforms not only along the frontlines but also throughout rear-area units. Additionally, drone-versus-drone combat training should be institutionalized across all echelons of the armed forces, ensuring that both special operations forces and conventional units are prepared to engage in this emerging domain of warfare.
Second, urban warfare readiness should be strengthened. Reservists and members of the ROK Home Reserve Forces must be trained in denying SOF access to critical rear-area infrastructure. This training should include urban defense tactics, methods for detecting sabotage, and procedures for securing key transportation and energy nodes.
Third, building C4ISR redundancy is essential. Command and control structures should be decentralized and made mobile, with communication systems that can operate on low bandwidth and remain functional even in the absence of satellite connectivity. Joint U.S.-ROK exercises should routinely include simulations of command node destruction to test continuity under pressure.
Fourth, shielding against cognitive warfare must become a national priority. AI-powered detection centers should be established to identify deepfakes, rumors, and manipulated content in real time. These capabilities must be fully integrated into national crisis management protocols. At the same time, public education campaigns should be launched to enhance societal resilience and reduce the effectiveness of psychological warfare.
Finally, wargaming must evolve to reflect the realities of hybrid nuclear conflict. Theater-level simulations should include scenarios involving tactical nuclear weapon use followed by hybrid warfare campaigns. These exercises should focus on managing the chaos that follows a tactical nuclear strike—such as SOF interdiction, electronic warfare mitigation, and civilian panic control—ensuring that both strategic planning and frontline responses are stress-tested under the most extreme conditions. Evaluating the effectiveness of unconventional military tactics—such as the combined use of tactical nuclear weapons, swarm drones, and AI-enabled platforms—would benefit from the application of commercial military simulation tools. South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD), for instance, has recently explored this approach, recognizing that existing high-cost simulators are primarily tailored to conventional systems and lack the adaptability needed to simulate next-generation technologies.
From System Shock to Strategic Urgency
From the snowy roads near Seoul in 1968 to the trenches of Ukraine in 2025, North Korea’s special operations forces have undergone a quiet but profound transformation. Once reliant on stealth and terrain, they now operate as a hybrid-hardened, multi-domain force—armed with lessons drawn from modern battlefields, battlefield technologies, and information warfare.
In a future Korean War, a tactical nuclear detonation may no longer represent the climax of conflict, but rather its violent and chaotic beginning. North Korea’s strategic logic may see a small-yield nuclear strike not as an endgame, but as a catalyst for immediate, layered exploitation—combining SOF incursions, drone saturation, information warfare, and urban sabotage in a single, synchronized campaign.
For the U.S.-ROK alliance, this evolving threat demands not just doctrinal revision, but systemic adaptation. Deterrence planning must shift from linear escalation models to nonlinear disruption scenarios. Wargaming must move beyond conventional timelines and simulate worst-case hybrid contingencies—including tactical nuke-triggered breakdowns of command, control, and civil order.
Ultimately, the question is no longer whether North Korea has the tools to fight differently. It is whether the United States and South Korea can adapt quickly and deeply enough to prevent the next war from being decided in its opening hours—by a system shock we failed to anticipate.
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim serves as President of the Security Management Institute, a defense-focused think tank affiliated with South Korea’s National Assembly. He has contributed to numerous defense initiatives and has advised key institutions, including the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff.
