When North Korea Brings Drone Mass to the Korean Peninsula

When North Korea Brings Drone Mass to the Korean Peninsula

North Korea’s growing experience with unmanned warfare is creating new challenges for South Korean air defense systems. Pyongyang would no longer treat drones primarily as instruments for reconnaissance or tools for occasionally penetrating South Korean airspace. The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated that when inexpensive unmanned systems are coupled with missiles, reconnaissance assets, and conventional firepower, they could impose prohibitively high costs on defenders.

Pyongyang was able to access such lessons to an unprecedented level. North Korean forces conducted combat alongside Russian troops on the European battlefield, while the mil-to-mil relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang deepened after the signing of the 2024 mutual defense treaty. Analysts have warned that North Korea is learning the utility of one-way attack UAVs and small battlefield drones, while Russian assistance could accelerate Pyongyang’s ability to develop and manufacture more capable unmanned systems. Satellite imagery in February 2026 detected Saebyeol-4 and Saebyeol-9 at the Panghyon UAV research and development facilities, indicating North Korea’s continued investment in large platforms.

Therefore, the question for Seoul is no longer simply whether South Korea’s defense mechanism could intercept individual North Korean drones or not. It is whether the existing defense architecture could continue to function when dozens—potentially hundreds—of drones arrive simultaneously while communications, sensors, and command networks are under attack.

Testing Swarm Drone Attack

To examine the problem, the author constructed a hypothetical scenario using Command: Modern Operations (CMO), a commercial wargaming tool. The key goal of the experiment was to assess how a local defense system could respond to numerically overwhelming adversaries when the higher-level air defense network was disrupted.

The scenario takes place on November 5, 2027. North Korea initially embarks upon an electromagnetic pulse attack, temporarily disrupting communications and parts of the integrated air defense system. North Korea then launches 200 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) from its two airfields—100 each from Hwangju and Hyon-ni—against Seoul Air Base at Seongnam.

The attack UCAVs were represented by MC-1C Grey Eagles armed with AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM). The Grey Eagle was used purely as a surrogate for a comparatively capable UCAV. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defensive swarm drones were represented by 40 F-5A fighters, since CMO did not offer air-to-air combat-capable swarm drones, which would be appropriate for the experiment. Thus, constraints were imposed on the F-5As in order to approximate some characteristics of a short-range defensive unmanned system: they were collectively operated, remained within 3–5 kilometers of Seongnam, and relied only on AIM-9B Sidewinders and cannon fire.

The first simulation produced a grim result. Among the 40 defenders, 34 were destroyed, while North Korea’s losses were only 12 out of 200 attack UCAVs. In addition, the attack damaged Seongnam’s control tower and 7 aircraft hangars. The defenders consumed 45 Sidewinders and a substantial amount of 20mm ammunition, while the attackers fired 787 JAGMs.

On the contrary, the second simulation demonstrated a considerably different outcome. South Korean losses fell to 22 aircraft, while North Korean losses increased to 47 UCAVs. The defenders fired 123 Sidewinders, while the attackers expended 480 JAGMs.

Needless to say, the outcome should not be interpreted literally. F-5As are not swarm drones, and North Korea does not possess 200 Grey Eagles. What matters most is why the result notably changed.

The Real Vulnerability Is Interrupted Coverage

When defending aircraft had sufficient fuel and confronted the attacking formations at an appropriate time, their performance substantially improved. But because 40 aircraft were operated as a single group, their return-to-base (RTB) cycle occasionally created an abrupt defense vacuum. When the aircraft returned to base collectively, the approaching UCAVs infiltrated within the defense parameters and could attack aircraft situated on the ground. Therefore, the experiment underscores the crucial requirement for future counter-drone defense: persistence.

Even a defensive system that could destroy dozens of UCAVs in a short-duration engagement could ultimately fail if it cannot maintain long-term surveillance and interception. Likewise, an effective interceptor system that has a short operational range could protect runways, but it could enable enemy drones to maneuver outside the engagement zone and approach again from different directions.

Also, the simulation showcased that North Korea does not necessarily need technically sophisticated autonomous swarm systems in order to cause operationally serious problems. Pyongyang’s future attacks could combine reconnaissance drones, one-way attack UCAVs, decoys, missiles, electronic warfare, cyber effects, and conventional firepower. Some of them could be used to directly neutralize targets, while others could force defenders to expose their radars, deplete interceptors, and distract attention across multiple threat axes.

In this environment, the problem becomes less about whether individual South Korean weapons systems are technically superior and more about whether the entire system could absorb large-scale attacks without generating a security vacuum that adversaries could exploit.

What USFK and Seoul Should Do

South Korea has already taken this issue seriously and adopted a number of measures. In June 2026, the Ministry of National Defense announced plans to field 60,000 unmanned systems by 2029, including 11,000 during 2026, while training as many as 500,000 military personnel in drone operations. Moreover, the program includes more than 20,000 rapidly acquired expendable drones and further work on lasers, high-power microwave systems, AI-enabled swarm systems, and counter-drone capabilities.

The overall direction seems appropriate, yet acquiring more drones is not equivalent to constructing a resilient Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) defense architecture. In that context, the following five policy recommendations are worth considering.

First, Seoul Air Base, Osan, Suwon, Cheongju, Gunsan, and other critical bases should be treated as independent defense nodes that could continuously conduct C-UAS operations even after losing communications with higher headquarters. The local sensors, identification systems, electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and directed-energy systems should be able to function under degraded communications.

Second, US Forces Korea (USFK) and South Korean forces should construct a multilayered cost-per-kill architecture. Expensive surface-to-air missiles should not be employed as a primary means of responding against far more inexpensive drones. Electronic warfare and high-power microwave systems should handle massive numbers of targets; guns and low-cost interceptor systems should engage penetrators at close proximity; high-end missiles should be reserved for threats whose speed, altitude, payload, and operational characteristics justify their use.

The objective is not simply to enhance tactical efficiency. The key is to prevent North Korea from securing an exchange-ratio advantage through affordable swarm attacks.

Third, defensive drones themselves should be organized for continuous rotation instead of pursuing RTB collectively. The CMO experiment has directly revealed this weakness. A portion of the defensive swarm drones should be able to recover, refuel, and rearm while others remain in the air. In that context, increased endurance and a wider operational range could be equally important as the speed or lethality of individual drones.

Fourth, USFK and South Korean forces should institutionalize massive C-UAS red-teaming in combined exercises. Alongside attacks, electronic warfare, cyber disruption, and attacks against airfields, Freedom Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield should regularly include hundreds of simulated aerial objectives. The goal should be for the combined command structure to identify various types of threats at the same time, set priorities, and test whether they could be defeated under degraded communications and command conditions.

Last but not least, the US-ROK alliance should treat drones as part of comprehensive saturation attacks, rather than as an isolated threat category. North Korea’s most dangerous innovation may not be the advanced autonomous drone system. It may simply be paralyzing US and South Korean decision-making and defense capabilities by operating a sufficient number of low-cost unmanned systems and employing other miscellaneous firepower.

Thus, the lesson of the CMO experiment is not whether 40 defensive drones could withstand or defeat 200 attack platforms. A more important finding is that even a capable defensive force could be unsuccessful when its coverage is limited, the engagement area is extremely narrow, or attackers could more rapidly generate large-scale assaults in comparison to the defender’s ability to regenerate its capabilities.

The implications for USFK and Seoul are straightforward. C-UAS defense should be built around continuous coverage, distributed local command, affordable multilayered interceptor systems, and constant exposure to saturation scenarios in combined exercises. North Korea is determined to exploit the gaps. Now it is time for the US-ROK side to speed up its efforts for the sake of stability on the Korean Peninsula, preventing an abrupt shift in the existing balance of power.

Table of Contents

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as a President at the Security Management Institute, a
defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly. He has been involved
in numerous defense projects and has provided consultation to several key organizations,
including the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Acquisition Program
Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the
Agency for Defense Development, and the Korea Research Institute for Defense Technology
Planning and Advancement. He holds a doctoral degree in international relations from the
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, a master’s degree in conflict
management from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS), and a degree in public policy from Seoul National University’s Graduate School of
Public Administration (GSPA).
Dr. Kim has written extensively on international security, diplomacy, and alliance management.
His work has appeared in a wide range of respected outlets, including the Lowy Institute, The
Strategist, CIMSEC, Britain's World, The Diplomat, War on the Rocks, 38 North, Breaking
Defense, Modern War Institute, Small Wars Journal, Geopolitical Monitor, The Geopolitics,
Global Defense Insight, Global Taiwan Institute, RealClearDefense, Asia Times, Modern
Diplomacy, Global Security Review, Central European Institute of Asian Studies, Visegrad
Insight, Defense Opinion, SOF News, Irregular Warfare Initiative, WavellRoom, East Asia
Forum, Pearls and Irritations, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Center for Maritime
Strategy, Defense Daily, Fulcrum, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Maritime
Executive, International Policy Digest, NK News, Korea Pro, E International Relations,
Euromaidan Press, Institute for Diplomacy and Economy, the Australian Centre for
International Studies, the Times of Israel, the Australian Naval Institute, Parley Policy Initiative,
and the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy

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