On 14 September, US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink told a conference in Maryland that the United States has fielded “on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile adversary action.” He gave no further details. Counterspace weapons are not new, and several states have tested them, but no major power had previously acknowledged weapons stationed in orbit. The statement moves space weaponisation from the margins of strategic debate to its centre. What matters is the effect on a domain where military and civilian systems are intertwined and the governing rules are thin. With dependence on satellites growing and arms control stalled, the question is where the competition goes next.
The disclosure
Meink presented the announcement as a matter of deterrence. He told reporters that acknowledging the capability matters for deterrence, whereas describing it would not help, and he declined to say why the announcement came now. The Space Force did not offer any details on the weapon’s kinetic or non-kinetic nature, while Meink stated that space control capabilities can be used for offensive or defensive means. The most probable match is orbital jammers, where destruction of a satellite would lead to debris that poses a danger to all operators.
The language was prepared. In April 2025 the commander of Space Command argued that the United States needed credible, acknowledged weapons to restore deterrence in space, and Meink’s speech described space-based interceptors for Golden Dome as flight ready. The sequence points to a deliberate move from taboo to acknowledgement, with details withheld.
From dependence to targeting
Militarisation of space is a concept that has been in existence for decades, and is used for support purposes in military operations. Satellites are used for reconnaissance, communications, navigation and missile warning and are an indispensable asset of modern forces. The next step, but not a new one, is to weaponise systems, making them capable of attacking space objects.
According to the Secure World Foundation, the destructive anti-satellite testing by the U.S., Russia, China and India left a record of 6,904 cataloged pieces of debris, including 2,773 that are still in orbit. These two are merging into one. Targets lead to dependence and dependence leads to counterspace capability. In the most active contest today, jamming and spoofing are being used, and in active conflicts, only non-destructive tools are being employed. Dual-use technologies are blurring the distinction between civilian and military. Many satellites have multiple purposes, meaning that interference with one for a particular purpose can disrupt another, of which the owner may not be aware. A defensive weapon, for example, may be interpreted as an attack weapon by someone who is targeted by it, and so is the main danger.
A widening field and weakened arms control
The Secure World Foundation tracks 13 countries developing counterspace capabilities. France has publicly pursued patrol satellites armed with lasers, and in 2020 US Space Command said Russia had conducted a non-destructive co-orbital anti-satellite test. Experts told Defense One that the admission could accelerate an arms race. Thereafter, the largest space power, being open about the weapons in orbit, can allow other space powers to become equally open.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit but does not prohibit conventional weapons. Efforts to add rules have stalled. In April 2024 Russia vetoed a US-Japanese Security Council resolution on weapons of mass destruction in space and offered a text banning all weapons in space, which also failed. Russia argued that the United States and its allies resisted a full ban because they planned to deploy weapons there, while critics say Russia’s draft is unverifiable and leaves ground-launched anti-satellite weapons untouched. Responsibility for the impasse is shared. Pakistan has told the Conference on Disarmament that there has been no progress on preventing an arms race in outer space for over four decades, and it has co-sponsored the “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” resolution every year since 2013.
What the future holds
Three paths are open. The first is drift: more acknowledged capabilities, more ambiguity and a rising debris risk, with no political process to check them. The second is partial rules. Transparency and confidence-building measures, notice of manoeuvres near other satellites and restraint on destructive tests need less trust than a treaty, and Pakistan has contributed to non-binding measures of this kind while still calling for a legally binding instrument. The third is rules written after an incident, which is the most dangerous route because it requires the crisis first.
The second path is the most realistic and the one most worth pursuing. States outside the major space powers have standing to press for it, and they have the most to lose from a contested orbital environment, since they depend on satellites for navigation, communications and disaster response without the means to defend them.
Weaponisation was already under way when Meink spoke, but his statement made Washington’s position plain and gave others a precedent to follow. What remains unsettled is whether the major powers will pair declared capabilities with agreed limits. The measures that would help are modest and need no treaty: notice of manoeuvres, restraint on destructive tests and channels for clarifying ambiguous activity. Without them, an incident is likely to impose the limits instead.
Table of Contents
ToggleAmna Saqib
Amna Saqib is research officer at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.



