India is bidding to place Pakistan on the FATF grey list again. Notably, India’s FATF move is not directed at pushing Pakistan towards sanctions since it can only happen by black listing of the state. In fact, this strategy is to achieve strategic advantage over Pakistan by threatening with external scrutiny, which is aimed at modulating Pakistan’s decision-making architecture vis-à-vis India. This shows that India has been emboldened to stage a deadlock, though unintentionally, but consequently by the United States’ bad bet on India in the US-China competition. However, succumbing to this strategic pressure within critical domains will potentially destabilize the nuclear deterrence equilibrium in South Asia in particular and in the entire Asian security theatre in general, which should be unacceptable to all great powers, including the US, since the region cannot afford an unchecked India in the nuclear high-stakes theatre.
India’s trying to assert strategic superiority in South Asia by lowering the threshold for initiating any military responses. India’s use of the Brahmos missile in the post-Pahalgam crisis reflects an offset strategy based on the assumption of asserting strategic dominance, designed to establish a threat of preemptive or punitive strikes, including communication of potential nuclear threat by the deployment of the dual-use weapon, thereby aiming to influence Pakistan’s decision-making regarding the parameters of the use of force in its retaliatory response. This deliberate strategic ambiguity, characterizing confusing or even diluting the lines between conventional and nuclear thresholds of the use of force, might be aiming at escalation control through ambiguity. However, such entanglement has a significant destabilization impact on nuclear South Asia’s crisis dynamics since it may lead to inadvertent escalation or even a preemptive strike if the nuclear use of the adversary is regulated by a ‘no no first use’ policy. If this is the future of the nuclear South Asia, then it’s a need to regulate the irresponsible behaviour of the states having nuclear weapons and yet resorting to periodic escalations with their perceived adversary with such modified weapon systems.
Also significantly, the ‘pain threshold’ within bilateral escalation dynamics in South Asia has been increased, which means conflicting states might be willing to endure a greater degree of force before full-escalation. Notably, Pakistan’s strategy to restore the deterrence by retaliation yet within the limits of the conventional domain of weapons, reflects a deliberate cautious approach wherein it has established a credible precedent of retaliating with strength, yet intentionally avoiding inadvertent escalation. Pakistan’s responsible behaviour is based on realization of the potential for inadvertent escalation that too between nuclear-armed adversaries. However, this normalization of higher-intensity of exchange of force predicts that this level of the use of missiles between India and Pakistan is likely to serve as a minimum threshold for measuring Indian offensives in future.
In terms of signaling, this way of the communication of threat shows Indian strategic manoeuver to influence Pakistan’s strategic decisions. For instance, India’s modernisation of its capabilities in the conventional and nuclear domains, particularly focusing on the missile defense systems and attempts to keep track of Pakistan’s strategic assets to enable itself to threaten and also potentially initiate escalation serve as the signals that have been designed to influence Pakistan’s decision making. These strategies intend to communicate India’s intend to periodic episodes of coercion, however, below the nuclear threshold, while also leveraging the induced ambiguity along with strategic signaling to seek the escalation dominance.
On the other hand, Pakistan’s response strategy provides for a counterbalance to Indian threats by relying on the credibility of its own nuclear deterrent and the strategic resilience that it has been able to seek in its warfare strategy. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is based on credible minimum deterrence. It has been focusing on the survivability of its nuclear arsenal and is advancing in development of cross-domain capabilities to counterbalance conventional superiority of India. Pakistan’s strategy aims to deter India’s periodic escalations and preserve the South Asian strategic stability, thereby countering Indian attempts to seek escalation dominance and the nuclear bluster. Pakistan’s resolve to retaliate with the greater degree of force communicates Pakistan’s deterrence posture to stand the Indian threats.
Komal Khan
Komal Khan is Research Officer at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Islamabad.
