A quiet revolution is unfolding above our heads. Thousands of satellites are now occupying Low Earth Orbit (LEO), promising to deliver global broadband connectivity and reshape the way nations communicate, project power, and secure critical infrastructure. Starlink, OneWeb, China’s Guowang, and other emerging LEO constellations are not mere commercial ventures. They are instruments of strategic influence, capable of determining who controls access to information, who manages command and control networks, and who remains vulnerable to external pressure. For Pakistan, a country with both strategic sensitivities and sub optimally connected regions, participation in the LEO broadband race is no longer a matter of choice. The real question is how to engage in a manner that safeguards sovereignty, preserves operational control, and strengthens national security.
Pakistan has demonstrated both ambition and limitations in space and communications infrastructure. SUPARCO’s PakSAT-MM1, launched in May 2024, is a high-power, multi-mission geostationary satellite operating across C, Ku, Ka, and L bands. Its mandate extends to broadband delivery, television broadcasting, mobile backhaul, and VSAT connectivity across Pakistan and neighbouring regions. The EO-1 satellite, launched in early 2025, added capabilities in earth observation, environmental monitoring, disaster tracking, and defence surveillance. These satellites are vital building blocks for Pakistan’s space capabilities. However, they are not substitutes for the low-latency, global coverage, and redundancy that LEO broadband constellations provide.
Yet ambition must contend with reality. Low Earth Orbit is becoming increasingly crowded, both physically and spectrally. Over 10,000 active satellites already circle the planet, and most optimal orbital shells and frequency bands have been claimed by large constellations led by the United States, China, and Europe. This congestion introduces practical barriers for late entrants such as Pakistan: securing orbital slots, coordinating spectrum through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and mitigating collision risks demand both diplomatic agility and technical sophistication. The question is not only whether Pakistan should enter LEO, but how it can do so meaningfully amid global congestion and competition.
These constraints do not preclude participation. Rather, they call for creative engagement. Pakistan can adopt hybrid strategies: hosting national payloads on allied or commercial platforms, leveraging partnerships within the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO), and accelerating filings to reserve spectrum and orbital rights before prime LEO shells become unavailable. Small, mission-specific constellations, focused on secure communications, disaster management, or data relay, could serve as pragmatic starting points. In an increasingly crowded orbit, strategic timing and coordination may matter as much as engineering prowess.
Regulatory developments over the past year suggests that Pakistan is starting to understand the significance. Starlink has been granted a provisional licence by the Pakistan Space Activities Regulatory Board, although full operational authorisation from the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) remains pending, highlighting potential institutional delays. Draft regulations on licensing, spectrum allocation, and gateway management are underway, yet Pakistan’s regulatory and institutional capacity, including technical expertise, enforcement, and inter-agency coordination, remains limited. The key challenge is to strengthen oversight and domestic control without compromising strategic autonomy.
Equally important, Pakistan must recognise that Starlink’s commercial calculus is shaped by profitability and geopolitical risk. With hardware costs near USD 500 and monthly fees exceeding USD 100 in a market where users spend under USD 10 on broadband, affordability is a major barrier. Moreover, Pakistan’s dependence on Chinese infrastructure and alignment with Beijing could deter Western investors without firm regulatory assurances, local partnerships, and political neutrality. For Elon Musk’s Starlink, partnership with Pakistan would thus depend on whether the policy environment offers commercial viability, payment security, and clear operational safeguards.
Therefore, these developments carry both promise and risk. Satellite internet could leapfrog Pakistan’s infrastructure deficits, connecting rural and mountainous districts that lack reliable fibre or mobile broadband. Yet without legal safeguards, foreign operators could control data routing, gateway stations, emergency shutdowns, and encryption. Therefore, a balanced approach, allowing multiple providers while ensuring affordability and data sovereignty, could make Pakistan a more credible partner for both Starlink and Chinese systems, rather than an exclusive client of either.
Such engagement must be informed by a clear understanding of competitive market dynamics and national priorities. To seize this opportunity while protecting sovereignty, Pakistan must adopt a multi-pronged strategic framework. First, sovereign control over critical infrastructure must be non-negotiable. Foreign operators should be required to permit domestic hosting and management of gateway and ground stations, with binding contracts guaranteeing access for national security, defence, and emergency services. Secondly, regulatory clarity and agility are critical. Draft regulations must define spectrum allocation across Ka, Ku, and V bands, establish interference thresholds, set lawful interception parameters, and ensure transparent, timely licensing. Finally, regional and international partnerships are indispensable. These should go beyond one-off vendor contracts to include shared ground stations, technology transfer, joint manufacturing, and collaborative R&D.
All in all, the LEO broadband revolution must be treated as a matter of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy, not merely as a technology policy issue. Pragmatism, understood as accepting foreign providers where necessary, must be paired with principle, namely, insisting on operational control, redundancy, and resilience. The orbiting networks above are not abstract technology; they are instruments of power. Pakistan’s response will define whether it controls its digital future or becomes a passenger in someone else’s orbit.
Faiza Abid
Faiza Abid is a research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore. She can be reached at info@casslhr.com.
