A New Baghdad Pact? The Mecca Accord and the Remaking of Regional Power

A New Baghdad Pact? The Mecca Accord and the Remaking of Regional Power

The Middle East may be watching the birth of a new security alliance. It may also be watching something considerably more ambitious: an attempt to build a political infrastructure through which powerful Muslim states can challenge Israel, reduce American influence, draw closer to China, and eventually set regional rules without Washington at the head of the table. The Mecca Accord leaves both possibilities open, and Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are already making decisions that could turn either one into reality.

Consider how unlikely this grouping would have looked only a few years ago. The Khashoggi affair had pushed Saudi-Turkish relations into a bitter confrontation, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan keeping the case alive internationally and using the evidence selectively gathered in Türkiye to maintain pressure on Riyadh. Then the case was transferred to Saudi Arabia, relations thawed followed the Crown Prince’s meeting with Erdogan in Turkiye, Saudi money returned to Türkiye, Turkish defense companies began winning Saudi business, and the two governments moved steadily closer on security. Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman has also appeared less often in some of the major international settings where he once dominated Saudi representation. Other senior members of the royal family, ministers, diplomats, and security officials have become more visible, and the opening to Türkiye has continued through them.

Pakistan fits easily into this new relationship because its military ties to Saudi Arabia go back decades. Pakistani personnel have served in the kingdom, trained Saudi forces, and developed relationships across the Saudi defense establishment. Türkiye and Pakistan have also spent years expanding their own military ties through exercises, naval projects, aircraft programs, and defense production. Pakistan brings an additional connection that could become increasingly important as this relationship develops: its exceptionally close military relationship with China.

Getting these three armies to fight together would be considerably harder than getting their governments into the same room. Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani forces work across Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, and English, use different communications systems, operate different weapons, and have been trained through very different military traditions. Turkish officers have spent decades working within NATO. Pakistan uses a mixture of Chinese, American, European, and domestic systems. Saudi Arabia still relies heavily on American and European weapons and technical support. Even communication inside a joint headquarters becomes a serious problem when missiles are incoming, intelligence arrives from several national services, and somebody has to decide who fires.

There is a useful historical precedent involving two of the same countries. Türkiye and Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1955. Britain joined on April 5, Pakistan on September 23, and Iran on November 3. The United States encouraged the alliance as part of its effort to build a “Northern Tier” along the Soviet Union’s southern approaches. Washington never formally joined, although it participated in committees, provided military assistance, maintained liaison with the organization, and supported its development.

The Baghdad Pact quickly acquired a permanent council and secretariat and began working on military planning, communications, infrastructure, intelligence, and counter-subversion. Its members also arrived with very different priorities. Türkiye pursued stronger defenses against the Soviet Union. Iran was interested in greater American military support and firmer security guarantees. Pakistan hoped for Western weapons and hoped its new position would strengthen it against India. Iraq wanted military assistance and greater influence in Arab politics. Britain sought to preserve its regional security role as its imperial position weakened.

The Mecca Accord brings together another group whose interests overlap without fully matching. Pakistan can extend its military role into the Middle East. Türkiye gains defense business, political access, and greater influence in the Red Sea, Syria, and potentially Gaza. Saudi Arabia gains military options beyond its traditional dependence on the United States. Regular exercises, arms deals, intelligence exchanges, and joint planning can serve all three governments even if they never create an army capable of operating under a single command.

The historical reversal is striking. Washington encouraged the Baghdad Pact because it wanted Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan tied more closely to the Western security system. Britain joined as a full member. The Mecca Accord is taking shape while Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are expanding the number of countries and suppliers they can turn to when Washington refuses a weapons sale, restricts intelligence, or disagrees with a regional operation. Pakistan brings extensive experience with Chinese weapons. Saudi Arabia has expanded defense and technological ties with Beijing. Türkiye has spent years developing its own defense industry.

Mecca also gives the new arrangement a political character the Baghdad Pact never possessed. The 1955 alliance grew out of Cold War geography. Its members formed a belt beneath the Soviet Union, which gave the American idea of a “Northern Tier” its name. The Mecca Accord invokes “brotherhood” and “Islamic solidarity” in Islam’s holiest city, under a Saudi monarchy whose custodianship of Mecca and Medina gives the agreement resonance well beyond its original three members.

That makes the possibility of Iranian participation particularly revealing. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact under the Shah because Tehran feared Soviet power and wanted stronger Western support. Today’s Islamic Republic has armed the Houthis, built relationships with armed groups fighting Israel, challenged American military power across the region, and expanded its relationship with China. Iranian troops would be extraordinarily difficult to integrate into a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military structure. Iranian diplomats could much more easily join consultations over Gaza, Israel, Western military deployments, sanctions, or relations with China.

The original Baghdad Pact also provides a warning about how quickly politics can change an alliance. The Iraqi monarchy fell in the July 14, 1958 revolution, Prime Minister Nuri al-Said was killed, and the new government under Abd al-Karim Qasim pulled away from the Western-backed security structure. Iraq formally withdrew in March 1959. Türkiye, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain continued under a new name, the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, while Washington signed bilateral defense agreements with Türkiye, Iran, and Pakistan that same month.

The Mecca Accord could develop the same ability to outlive the crisis that produced it. Step by step it is becoming institutionalized. Turkish technicians based in Saudi Arabia, Pakistani officers assigned to joint headquarters, intelligence channels established for missile defense, and weapons bought for multinational operations would remain useful after a Houthi offensive ended. Those relationships could later be redirected toward another theater without recreating the entire structure.

That possibility becomes more urgent now that the Houthis have resumed a violent and increasingly well-organized offensive against both Aden and Saudi Arabia. The attacks give the Mecca Accord its first opportunity to prove that collective defense can produce an actual military response rather than political consultation alone. Riyadh needs additional air defenses, better intelligence on Houthi launch sites and weapons movements, drone operators, electronic-warfare capabilities, and forces that can deploy quickly if the fighting spreads. Türkiye can provide many of those capabilities and personnel with recent operational experience, while Pakistan can contribute experienced officers, troops, trainers, and decades of familiarity with the Saudi military. If Ankara and Islamabad begin supplying these capabilities through the Accord rather than through separate bilateral arrangements with Riyadh, the Houthi offensive could turn the Mecca framework into a working regional security structure.

Reports about an anti-Houthi rapid-response force deserve particular attention. Turkish aircraft and drones would need access to Saudi airfields, maintenance facilities, spare parts, fuel, and secure communications. Pakistani personnel would need places to deploy and clear relationships with Saudi and Turkish commanders. Intelligence officers would need rules governing what they can share and how quickly targeting information can reach pilots, drone crews, or air-defense units.

Yemen could also bring the Mecca partners directly into competition with the UAE. Abu Dhabi has spent years developing relationships with southern Yemeni forces and building influence around ports, islands, coastlines, and local security institutions. Riyadh has supported its own Yemeni partners and pursued its own preferences for the country’s future. Türkiye would enter with a long history of rivalry with the UAE across Libya, Qatar, Somalia, and struggles involving political Islamist movements. Pakistani forces working through a Saudi-centered structure would give Riyadh more manpower and military options in areas where Saudi and Emirati interests diverge.

Saudi money could pay a Yemeni formation using Turkish drones and communications systems while Pakistani officers trained its personnel. Its commanders would build relationships with the governments supplying their salaries, weapons, intelligence, and air support. Turkish companies could continue maintaining equipment after the immediate fighting subsided, while Pakistani advisers could remain inside training institutions. Officers who benefited from those relationships could eventually move into Yemen’s national military and security bodies.

Syria offers Türkiye another route for expanding the same relationships. Ankara already has troops across northern Syria and extensive intelligence contacts there. Saudi financing could help pay personnel, rebuild security bodies, purchase equipment, and support training, while Pakistan could provide instructors and officers. Türkiye could use the resulting institutions to press Damascus over Kurdish commanders, who are already being integrated into the Syrian Armed Forces,  heavy weapons, border crossings, and the deployment of Syrian government forces into areas that up until recently were controlled by Kurdish-led formations.

Gaza presents an even more sensitive possibility. Saudi Arabia could finance reconstruction or Palestinian security bodies, Türkiye could send police, monitors, engineers, or military personnel, and Pakistan could provide trainers. Israeli forces could then encounter Turkish or Pakistani personnel around border crossings, protected facilities, reconstruction sites, or Palestinian security positions. A dispute over a convoy, weapons search, raid, tunnel, or checkpoint could quickly involve Ankara, Islamabad, and Riyadh. For now, this plan is up in the air as the Board of Peace’s plan to disarm Hamas and deradicalize Gaza remains largely theoretical.

China can gain from these relationships without joining the Accord. Pakistan already operates large quantities of Chinese military equipment and works closely with Chinese defense manufacturers. Saudi Arabia has purchased Chinese weapons and expanded technological and economic ties with Beijing. Saudi officers working alongside Pakistani counterparts would gain direct exposure to Chinese systems already tested in Pakistani service, while Chinese companies would gain opportunities to sell communications equipment, drones, missiles, surveillance systems, or air defenses into a military network increasingly connected to Pakistan.

Washington would then face practical problems over intelligence and access. American information shared with Saudi Arabia could enter command centers containing Pakistani or Turkish officers. Chinese-built communications or surveillance systems could operate near American equipment. Saudi Arabia could respond to restrictions on American weapons or intelligence by buying elsewhere, bringing in Turkish capabilities, or requesting Pakistani personnel.

The Baghdad Pact tried to connect Middle Eastern and South Asian states more closely to Western power. Seventy-one years later, two of its former members, Türkiye and Pakistan, could help Saudi Arabia build a security structure that gives all three governments more freedom from Washington. If Iran eventually enters its political institutions, the reversal becomes even more pronounced: a country that joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 seeking protection within a Western-backed security system would participate in its twenty-first-century echo while challenging American influence and expanding ties with China.

The first Baghdad Pact eventually lost Baghdad, while the relationships it created survived under CENTO. If the Mecca Accord leaves behind Turkish personnel on Saudi bases, Pakistani officers in joint headquarters, permanent intelligence channels, common procurement, and multinational deployments, its name may eventually become the least important thing about it.

 

Irina Tsukerman
Irina Tsukerman

Irina Tsukerman is a US national security lawyer and president of the geopolitical risk strategic advisory Scarab Rising, Inc. She is also a board member of The Washington Outsider Center for Information Warfare. Her work and media appearances can be found on her profile.

Share this post :

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Latest News

Subscribe our newsletter

Sign up our newsletter to get update information, news and free insight.