Decolonization Without Strategy: How Symbolic Policies Contributed to Security Instability in African Nations

Decolonization Without Strategy: How Symbolic Policies Contributed to Security Instability in African Nations

The Sahel alone accounts for 41 percent of all deaths linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa. Burkina Faso continues to experience the highest levels of violence in the Sahel, accounting for 50 percent of all militant Islamist-linked fatalities in the region. Mali represents over 29 percent of these fatalities, while Niger 17 percent. These figures are laid down by Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).

Somalia also saw a surge in violence linked to militant Islamist groups over the past year, resulting in a 93-percent increase in fatalities (from 4,561 to 8,813), a record high. The spike represents the largest annual shift recorded in any region on the continent and follows a marked lull in fatalities during the previous year, according to ACSS.

Rejecting all Western and international security partnerships in the name of “decolonization” may carry political appeal, but as a strategy it is deeply flawed. It confuses symbolism with substance. In regions like the Sahel, where militant groups are expanding in reach and coordination, security is not an abstract ideal, it is a practical, resource-intensive challenge. Walking away from existing counterterrorism frameworks without a viable replacement does not restore sovereignty; it risks eroding the state’s already fragile capacity to protect its citizens.

The recent trajectory in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger illustrates this tension. Military-led governments have severed or downgraded long-standing partnerships with regional and international actors, often framing these moves as a reclaiming of independence. Yet these decisions have come alongside shrinking intelligence-sharing networks, reduced logistical support, and weakened coordination against transnational threats. Armed groups, by contrast, have adapted quickly, operating across borders, exploiting governance gaps, and embedding themselves in local grievances. The result is a widening asymmetry: states with fewer tools facing adversaries that are becoming more agile and entrenched.

The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, alongside their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States, further compounds these challenges rather than resolving them. While framed as a move toward regional self-reliance and political sovereignty, the shift risks deepening fragmentation in an already volatile security landscape. ECOWAS, despite its limitations, provided a broader institutional framework for coordinated responses, diplomatic leverage, and multilateral security engagement. By contrast, the AES remains nascent, with limited capacity, unclear operational coherence, and far fewer resources at its disposal. This restructuring reduces opportunities for intelligence integration and joint operations across a wider regional network, while potentially isolating member states from external support mechanisms. In effect, instead of strengthening collective resilience, the transition may entrench strategic isolation, leaving these states more exposed to the very transnational threats they seek to counter.

Reliance on Russian paramilitary support has been presented as an alternative model, one free from Western political conditions. But this, too, raises hard questions. These arrangements are typically opaque, transactional, and narrowly focused on regime security rather than broader institutional strengthening. They do little to build sustainable capacity within national armies or to address the underlying drivers of conflict, such as governance deficits, economic marginalization, and local distrust. In some cases, heavy-handed tactics have exacerbated tensions with civilian populations, creating openings for militant recruitment rather than closing them.

If decolonization is the goal, then replacing one external dependency with another is a curious way to pursue it. True autonomy requires diversification, leverage, and accountability, not isolation or overreliance. States are not obligated to accept unfavourable terms from Western partners, and there is legitimate space to renegotiate relationships that better reflect national priorities. But rejecting engagement altogether, while simultaneously depending on a single external actor, undermines the very principle of strategic independence.

A more coherent approach would distinguish between political signalling and operational necessity. Governments could assert sovereignty by setting clearer terms of engagement, increasing transparency in agreements, and ensuring that partnerships, whether Western, Russian, or otherwise, serve long-term national interests rather than short-term regime survival. Maintaining multiple channels of cooperation would preserve flexibility and reduce vulnerability to any single partner’s withdrawal or shifting priorities.

Ultimately, security policy should be judged by outcomes, not rhetoric. The primary obligation of any government is to safeguard its population and stabilize its territory. When decisions framed as “decolonization” led to diminished capacity, rising violence, and deeper external dependence, they deserve scrutiny, instead of celebrations.

Dan Horphet Ibiassi, Congolese expert in political communication, in an interview on 3rd of May 2025 with Sputnik Africa stressed, “the Russian army is assisting the Malian army in its security structuring, so that the entire Malian territory is finally pacified and the Malian people can go about their business in a completely free manner.” However, he claims that Russian support is “structuring” Mali’s security and paving the way for nationwide stability doesn’t hold up against recent developments on the ground.

First, the situation in northern Mali, particularly the loss of Kidal, undercuts the idea of effective territorial control or “pacification.” If anything, it highlights how fragile state authority remains despite years of external security assistance. The reported withdrawal or reduced presence of Russian paramilitary forces at critical moments raises further questions about reliability and long-term commitment.

Second, the broader security trend is moving in the opposite direction of what’s being claimed. Armed groups have become more coordinated, more mobile, and more capable of launching complex attacks across regions. This is not consistent with a security environment that is stabilizing; it suggests gaps in intelligence, coordination, and local trust, areas that short-term, externally driven military arrangements often struggle to address.

Third, high-level insecurity, such as the death of Malian Defence Minister, General Sadio Camara, signals that even the upper tiers of the state are not insulated from the deteriorating environment. That’s a stark indicator of systemic weakness, not successful “structuring.”

If the goal is a Mali where citizens can “go about their business freely,” then the current trajectory suggests that reliance on a narrow, militarized approach, especially one dependent on a single external partner, is falling short.

Harrelson Yee Wen Foo
Harrelson Yee Wen Foo

Harrelson Yee Wen Foo is a law graduate based in Malaysia focusing on international affairs and legal policy. He is also a geopolitical & foreign policy analyst with published work in The Diplomat and Record of Law.

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