Beyond US–China Rivalry: Erik Lenkart on the Indo-Pacific’s Shifting Security Order

Beyond US–China Rivalry: Erik Lenkart on the Indo-Pacific’s Shifting Security Order

The Indo-Pacific is undergoing a profound strategic transformation as intensifying competition between the United States and China, the growing influence of regional middle powers, and evolving economic and technological security challenges reshape the regional balance of power. While Washington and Beijing remain central to the region’s security dynamics, countries such as India, Japan, and Australia are increasingly strengthening cooperation in maritime security, critical technologies, and supply-chain resilience. At the same time, vulnerabilities surrounding strategic maritime chokepoints, energy security, and critical infrastructure are adding new dimensions to an already complex geopolitical environment.

In an exclusive interview with Global Defense Insight (GDI), Erik Lenkart, an Indo-Pacific expert in the Asia and Pacific Department of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, shares his perspectives on the evolving regional security architecture, the sustainability of US alliances, and the strategic importance of emerging middle powers. Speaking with Shayantan Bhowmick, Lenkart also examines the growing intersection of military, economic, and technological security, the European Union’s role in regional maritime stability, and the implications of potential disruptions to critical trade routes, including the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz.

 

 

How do you assess the current strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific, and what has changed most significantly in the last five years?

The strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly defined by US-China competition, which remains the principal driver of regional security dynamics. At the same time, we have seen promising growth in cooperation among regional middle powers, particularly Australia, India, and Japan, although this should not be mistaken for a formal alliance. Their cooperation is strongest in areas such as maritime security, supply-chain resilience, and critical technologies, while security cooperation largely remains bilateral in nature.

One of the most significant lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic was the vulnerability of highly optimized just-in-time supply chains. This accelerated efforts to diversify production and reduce dependence on single suppliers, particularly in critical sectors.

Another important development has been the relative weakness of the US economic pillar in the Indo-Pacific. The US withdrawal from the TPP created a gap that has never been fully addressed. While the United States remains the leading security actor in the region, successive administrations have struggled to offer an economic framework comparable to CPTPP. More recently, US strategic attention has increasingly been divided by developments in the Middle East and challenges closer to home in Latin America. Finally, despite frequent references to ASEAN centrality, ASEAN’s practical influence on major strategic developments has so far been relatively limited, with many key initiatives emerging through minilateral arrangements rather than ASEAN-led mechanisms.

Do you see the Indo-Pacific primarily through a security lens, or are economic, technological, and maritime factors becoming equally important?

I do not think these issues can be separated. Economic security, technological security, and traditional military security are increasingly interconnected. Access to critical minerals, rare earths, semiconductors, and secure energy supplies is essential both for economic growth and for maintaining modern defense capabilities.

Maritime security is not just a naval issue. The Indo-Pacific depends on secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) that carry the majority of the region’s trade and energy imports. The security of undersea communication cables is equally important, as they underpin global digital connectivity, financial transactions, and data flows. Any disruption to either maritime routes or critical communications infrastructure would have significant economic and strategic consequences.

Cooperation against piracy, maritime crime, and threats to freedom of navigation therefore remains an important area of international cooperation. In this regard, the European Union plays a constructive role in the Indo-Pacific. Although it is not a military power on the scale of the United States or China in the region, EU initiatives and operations such as Operation Atalanta contribute to maritime security, freedom of navigation, and the protection of critical trade routes. Competition today therefore extends beyond military power to supply chains, industrial capacity, technological leadership, critical infrastructure, and secure access to global commons.

How sustainable is the US alliance network in the Indo-Pacific over the long term?

I believe its sustainability will depend on whether it evolves beyond a predominantly military framework. US allies increasingly recognize that long-term cooperation must also be based on technology, industry, and supply chains.

Countries such as Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea are becoming more deeply integrated with the United States in areas ranging from critical technologies to defense industrial cooperation. The objective is to anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific not only through military commitments, but also through economic and technological interdependence. Initiatives such as AUKUS, the Quad, semiconductor cooperation, and critical minerals partnerships should be viewed in this broader context. The more indispensable allies become to one another, the more resilient the network is likely to be.

Are middle powers becoming more important in preventing the Indo-Pacific from becoming dominated by a single great power?

Yes, although we should not overstate their influence. Individually, middle powers continue to face significant constraints. Japan’s security role is still shaped by constitutional and political limitations. The Republic of Korea remains primarily invested in developments on the Korean Peninsula. Australia’s ability to influence US policy remains limited despite its close relationship with Washington. India’s strategic focus remains concentrated on the Indian Ocean and its competition with China, including the implications of China-Pakistan cooperation.

However, collectively these middle powers are becoming increasingly important. They may not be able to shape the regional order on their own, but they can strengthen regional resilience, diversify strategic partnerships, and make it more difficult for any single great power to dominate the Indo-Pacific. Their role is therefore not to replace the major powers, but to help preserve strategic balance.

How could disruptions around the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, or other maritime chokepoints affect Indo-Pacific security?

They already affect Indo-Pacific security, particularly in the area of energy security. The Strait of Hormuz remains critical for global energy exports, while the Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most important trade routes. Any major disruption, whether caused by conflict, geopolitical tensions, terrorism, piracy, or accidents, would have immediate consequences for energy prices, supply chains, and economic stability across the region.

For major energy importers such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and many Southeast Asian economies, maritime chokepoints are therefore not simply a naval concern but a fundamental national security issue. This is one reason why initiatives aimed at strengthening energy resilience and supply-chain security are becoming increasingly important. In this regard, projects such as POWERR Asia, as well as broader efforts to diversify energy sources and transport routes, represent constructive steps toward improving regional energy security and reducing vulnerabilities.

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