IDDA President Stayko Topalov on Europe’s Counter-Drone Defense, Emerging Threats and Airspace Security

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Global Defense Insight (GDI) conducted an exclusive interview with Stayko Topalov, President of the International Drone Defense Association (IDDA), examining the rapidly evolving landscape of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), emerging drone threats, and the growing importance of integrated airspace security. With more than eight years of experience in counter-drone technologies, autonomous systems, and security solutions, Topalov discussed the operational challenges confronting European defense institutions, the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure, and the urgent need to strengthen preparedness against increasingly sophisticated unmanned threats. He emphasized that technological advancement alone cannot guarantee effective protection without coordinated responses, institutional readiness, and clearly defined operational responsibilities.

Throughout the interview, Topalov explored the lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine, security challenges in the Black Sea region, and the role of artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, and multilayered detection systems in shaping next-generation counter-drone capabilities. He also discussed NATO interoperability, European defense cooperation, independent technology evaluation, and IDDA’s initiatives to establish regional testing, training, and innovation networks. Looking toward 2030, Topalov outlined his vision for strengthening international partnerships, supporting defense technology startups, and developing resilient security architectures capable of protecting civilian populations, national airspace, and critical infrastructure. “Detection without response is not protection,” he stressed, underscoring the need to transform technological innovation into reliable operational capabilities.

 

As President of the International Drone Defense Association (IDDA), what inspired you to lead this initiative, and what are the organization’s principal objectives and long-term strategic priorities?

For years, I have seen the same dangerous gap between technological capability and operational readiness. We have extraordinary innovation in detection, autonomous systems and counter-drone technologies. Yet too often these capabilities remain fragmented. An institution may purchase an advanced detection system without establishing who receives the warning, who has the authority to respond and how the systems work together.

Detection without response is not protection.

This is one of the fundamental reasons behind IDDA. We established the association as an independent international platform connecting governments, defence institutions, industry, researchers, investors and operational experts. Our purpose is not to promote individual products or manufacturers. It is to help create the conditions for effective, interoperable and responsible security capabilities.

Our priorities are practical: independent technology evaluation, realistic operational training, cooperation between established industry and emerging innovators, and stronger coordination between civilian and military authorities. At HEMUS 2026, we helped create opportunities for innovative companies to engage directly with industry and institutional stakeholders.

Our longer-term ambition is to develop a regional network for testing, validation, training and innovation, connecting Bulgaria with partners across Europe. Ultimately, security should be understood not as a collection of equipment, but as an integrated capability built around protecting people.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated the growing effectiveness of low-cost drones against conventional defense systems. What are the most significant challenges facing military and civilian counter-UAS capabilities today?

The greatest challenge is that the threat is evolving faster than many institutions can adapt. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can challenge sophisticated and costly defence capabilities. Different drones, autonomous platforms and unconventional control methods require different approaches to detection and response.

There is no single technology capable of addressing every threat. Radar, radio-frequency detection, electro-optical systems, acoustic sensors and other technologies all have strengths and limitations. They must work together as part of an integrated architecture.

But technology is only one part of the challenge. Who receives the warning? Who verifies it? Who has the legal authority to intervene? What happens if communications fail? These questions determine whether a security system actually works.

Civilian infrastructure presents particular challenges. Airports, energy facilities and ports cannot simply employ every available countermeasure without considering public safety, aviation regulations and consequences for surrounding communities.

The reported attacks involving commercial vessels in Bulgaria’s Black Sea exclusive economic zone on 6 October 2026 underline the urgency of coordinated regional preparedness. Facts and responsibility must be established by the competent authorities, but the wider lesson is clear: the Black Sea requires cooperation across borders and an understanding of aerial and maritime unmanned threats.

We must move from reacting to incidents toward preparing for them.

Artificial intelligence, autonomous drone swarms, and electronic warfare are transforming the modern battlefield. Which emerging technologies do you believe will play the most decisive role in next-generation counter-UAS systems?

Artificial intelligence will play an important role, particularly in sensor fusion, threat classification, early warning and decision support. But I would caution against treating AI as a solution in itself. The question is whether it helps operators identify threats more accurately, make better decisions and respond faster under real operational conditions.

Future architectures will combine radar, electro-optical and infrared systems, passive radio-frequency sensing, acoustic detection and, where appropriate, lidar. Electronic warfare will remain important, but increasing autonomy and alternative control methods mean no single countermeasure is universally effective.

Interceptor technologies and directed-energy systems may provide additional options for suitable missions, provided performance, safety and operational limitations are properly assessed.

Interoperability is critical. A country should not need to replace its entire security architecture whenever a new sensor or response technology becomes available. We need modular systems, secure communications, resilient command-and-control networks and interfaces that allow new capabilities to be integrated.

Cybersecurity is equally essential. A counter-drone system must itself be protected against manipulation, compromised data and communications failures. The most effective systems will combine AI-assisted analysis with accountable human decision-making.

The future is not simply autonomous technology. It is intelligent, integrated and responsible security.

Protecting airports, energy installations, military bases, and other critical infrastructure has become a major security concern. What measures should governments and infrastructure operators prioritize to strengthen their defenses against evolving drone threats?

The first priority is understanding what needs to be protected and against which threats. Every facility has a different risk profile. An airport, a power plant, a port and a military base cannot be protected through an identical solution. Assess vulnerabilities, existing capabilities, consequences and legal responsibilities before selecting technology.

Procurement sometimes begins with equipment rather than the operational problem. That approach must change. The second priority is an integrated protective architecture connecting detection, identification, tracking, assessment and authorised response through common command and control.

The third is preparedness. Technology cannot compensate for unclear responsibilities, insufficient training or missing procedures. Governments must establish coordination among defence, police, civil aviation, intelligence, emergency responders and infrastructure operators.

IDDA has called for stronger surveillance, an assessment of existing capabilities, closer cooperation with Romania and Türkiye, and clear institutional responsibility for implementing improvements. Security must also include resilience: continuity of essential services, incident management and recovery.

The real test is not how impressive a system looks during a demonstration, but how effectively it protects people and services under pressure.

With growing security challenges across Europe, particularly along NATO’s eastern flank, how do you assess current counter-UAS preparedness, and what improvements are needed in multinational cooperation and interoperability?

Europe has considerable technological expertise, but operational preparedness remains uneven. Some countries and institutions are advancing rapidly, while others are still establishing capabilities, procedures and legal frameworks. We should not confuse investment or political attention with demonstrated readiness.

The European Commission’s February 2026 Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security and NATO interoperability exercises are important developments. But strategies and exercises must translate into capabilities that function under real conditions.

Interoperability means more than connecting devices: institutions must exchange relevant information, interpret threats consistently, coordinate decisions and operate together when necessary.

Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye have a shared interest in stronger maritime surveillance, coordinated incident reporting and practical exercises. Regional partners outside the EU and NATO should also be involved wherever cooperation is appropriate.

IDDA facilitates dialogue, brings together expertise, encourages common evaluation methods and supports cooperation between institutions and industry. We do not replace national authorities; we help connect the knowledge and experience required for better decisions.

Security threats do not stop at national borders. Our preparedness cannot stop there either.

Testing, validation, and operational training are essential for effective counter-drone deployment. How can governments and defense organizations establish reliable standards to evaluate counter-UAS technologies under realistic operational conditions?

A successful demonstration is not the same as an operationally reliable capability. A system may perform exceptionally well under controlled conditions and face very different challenges in a complex environment.

Evaluation should begin with operational requirements and measurable criteria: detection and tracking accuracy, false alarms, identification confidence, response times, resilience under degraded conditions and performance against relevant threat categories.

Testing must consider realistic environments, multiple simultaneous targets and the interaction between components. We must also examine failure: can operators function if a sensor becomes unavailable or communications are disrupted?

Independence matters. Evaluation needs transparent criteria, repeatable testing and safeguards against conflicts of interest. Operators must also practise interpreting uncertain information, coordinating with authorities and acting within legal responsibilities.

This is why IDDA proposes a regional testing, validation and training network. We are developing cooperation with Bulgarian academic and defence research stakeholders and exploring complementary capabilities with Greek partners, including JOIST. These initiatives are under development; any accreditation would require the appropriate independent processes.

Trust in security technology must be earned through demonstrated performance.

IDDA has been actively supporting defense innovation and startup development, including initiatives associated with HEMUS 2026. How is the association facilitating cooperation between emerging technology companies, established manufacturers, investors, and defense institutions?

Some of the most promising technological ideas emerge from small, highly specialised companies. But developing an innovative solution and bringing it into operational use are different challenges. Startups need access to users, testing, industrial partners, financing and procurement knowledge. Established manufacturers can benefit from their speed and expertise.

At HEMUS 2026, IDDA supported opportunities for startups, established industry and institutional stakeholders to engage directly. Companies such as Nomadium, Exot, Bronia AI, GeoEcom and Visign illustrate the diversity of the ecosystem.

The important achievement was creating conditions for serious conversations about operational needs and possible cooperation. The next step is to turn those conversations into practical results.

We start with a security challenge and bring together appropriate expertise: a specialised startup, an industrial integrator, a university supporting research, and an institutional user defining the mission.

We are developing the concept of an innovation hub and accelerator linked to testing, validation and training. Its aim is meaningful feedback, credible evaluation and pathways to practical adoption. IDDA must preserve its independence: supporting innovation does not mean endorsing every product.

Innovation becomes valuable to security when it moves from an idea to a reliable, deployable capability.

Question: Looking toward 2030, how do you envision the future of drone defense and airspace security, and what major initiatives or international partnerships can we expect from IDDA in the coming years?

By 2030, counter-drone security will be an essential part of national security planning and critical infrastructure protection. Legitimate unmanned aviation will also expand, bringing economic and technological opportunities. Our challenge is to enable that development while protecting airspace, infrastructure and civilian life.

I expect greater integration of distributed sensors, AI-assisted decision support, resilient command-and-control systems and adaptable response technologies. But the most important transformation must also be institutional: moving from fragmented procurement to long-term capability planning, continuous training and regular evaluation.

For IDDA, the priorities are regional testing and validation, operational training, international partnerships and an innovation hub connecting technology developers with real security requirements.

Bulgaria is an important starting point. We are exploring cooperation with Greek partners, including JOIST, developing relationships with Romanian research and industry stakeholders, and pursuing an Austrian presence. These initiatives are at different stages and depend on agreements and resources.

We want to contribute meaningfully to European and Allied cooperation within appropriate institutional frameworks. Success should not be measured by systems purchased, conferences organised or strategies announced.

By 2030, success should be measured by how many lives, communities and essential services Europe is genuinely capable of protecting. That is the contribution I want IDDA to make.

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