India’s New Offensive Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capabilities

India’s New Offensive Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capabilities

Recently, the Indian Navy (IN) has invested heavily in acquiring platforms for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), including shallow-water aircraft, frigates and destroyers, helicopters, and submarines. Inducting ASW platforms at such a pace indicates an offensive mindset; IN wants to ensure its operational freedom while limiting the options for the adversary. Before analyzing the latest inductions by the IN, it is of paramount importance to understand the theoretical premise on which ASW operates.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) is a form of underwater warfare that relies on surface combatants, aircraft, submarines, and other platforms to locate, track, and destroy the adversary’s submarines. The basic idea is to ensure sea control while denying the adversary the freedom to deploy submarines to its advantage. However, locating submarines in deep waters is a challenging and daunting task that requires technical expertise and sophisticated infrastructure.

SONAR (Sound Navigation and Ranging) is the basic technology that is being used in the detection of submarines. Active Sonar will send the sound pulses and receive the incoming echoes, while passive sonar will quietly listen to the noise created by the traversing submarines.

Usually, ASW strategies fall into three categories: destruction, containment, and limitation of the war-fighting efficiency of the adversary submarine fleet. The most opted operational strategy for destroying the submarines is to destroy them at their source. The source may be an operational base, maintenance, or a repair facility. Destroying at the source relieves one from delving into the cumbersome task of locating a submarine. Although submarines are usually stationed in heavily guarded premises, attacking a highly secured submarine will be a very risky move. Destruction strategies in the patrol areas can be of two types: offensive and defensive. For the offensive, the Hunt and kill approach is used, although it is heavily reliant on the gathered intelligence. Defensive approach is based on escorting the potential targets of adversary submarines: the convoy method.

Due to the risk of casualties in the destruction strategies, containment strategies are preferred. For the static containment, minefields serve the purpose, for containing adversaries in the transit and patrol areas, one also needs a reactive force for continuous patrols.

If the destruction as well as containment strategies fail, the last option is to limit the war-fighting efficiency of the adversary submarines while reducing their productive patrol time and forcing them to choose time-consuming paths. This can be done by beefing up one’s own aerial surveillance with the help of maritime surveillance aircraft.

Among the latest inductions, Shallow Water Craft (SWC) warrants greater attention, as frigates and destroyers are unable to detect submarines in shallow waters. India has inducted four new SWC including INS Arnala, INS Androth, INS Mahe, and INS Anjadip. These SWCs are fitted with ABHAY Hull Sonar and Low-Frequency Variable Depth Sonar (LFVDS).

It is usually difficult to detect submarines in shallow waters, as sea-bed masking is relatively easy due to the changes in the temperature and disturbances in the tidal layers, thus making sound propagation unstable.  Submarines do sea-bed masking while mixing their acoustic signatures with the sea-bed disturbances.

Earlier Indian frigates and destroyers operated towed array sonars and previous versions of hull-mounted sonars. Towed array sonars have a very long cable, and they listen passively in deep waters where there is less interference from the bottom and sound layers are relatively stable. These features help towed arrays detect at long distances in blue waters. However, towed arrays are less suitable in shallow waters because there are many seabed disturbances, and operating in passive mode, they are overwhelmed by the noise from numerous commercial and shipping vessels. For this, LFVDS are used in the latest SWC. LFVDS can easily go below the noisy surfaces and bypass temperature layers, which causes the sound waves to bend; furthermore, it operates at low frequencies, thus raising its potential for detecting quieter diesel-electric submarines from long distances.

Newly inducted SWCs have lightweight torpedo launchers integrated with Abhay hull sonars as well as with LFVDS, missing in the earlier ships. Additionally, these ships will have an RBU-6000 anti-submarine rocket launcher and will also lay mines for sea denial. Previously, the Indian Navy lacked these capabilities in the shallow waters.

Similarly, advanced Abhay hull-mounted sonars will significantly increase the detection capabilities of SWCs. Earlier hull-mounted sonars had analogue processing, thus low computational prowess for filtering noise. Abhay Sonars have digital signal processing, thus a better ability to filter noise while optimizing energy. These advanced sonars can network with ASW rockets and torpedoes, thus exhibiting Network Centric Warfare (NCW) ability.

The Indian Navy now has two operational squadrons of MH-60R multi-role ASW helicopters. Earlier IN operated Sea King Mk 42B, which has semi-fixed dipping sonars, no integrated sonobuoys, no network integration, and semi-digital data processing. MH-60R has AN/AQS-22 modern and variable depth active-passive sonar, integrated sonobuoy systems, and digital signal processing and classification with a fully networked operational capability.

India is investing heavily in the shallow water ASW capabilities with a focus on sea-denial and rapid attack on the adversary submarines. Frigates and destroyers, alongside ASW role helicopters, will execute ASW in the deep waters, and newly inducted SWCs will assist in the shallow waters. As the Indian coastal line has large swathes of shallow waters, India needed to develop shallow water ASW capabilities. However, these inductions fit more into the offensive logic focusing on sea-denial, while ensuring their own sea control. By this logic, IN wants to deny Pakistan’s advantage in deploying submarines near its shore, while fielding its own submarines for ISR, and escorting strike formations.

Pakistan must remain cognizant of these developments and induct platforms that will deny any such advantage to India to ensure strategic balance in the region.

Saif ul Haq

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Saif ul Haq

Saif ul Haq is a Research Officer (RO) at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Islamabad. 

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