Europe’s rapidly evolving security environment is reshaping how governments, armed forces, and defence companies approach military modernisation, industrial capacity, and operational readiness. From rising defence expenditure and changing procurement priorities to the growing role of artificial intelligence, simulation, and synthetic training, European militaries are under increasing pressure to strengthen capabilities while improving affordability, interoperability, and speed of delivery.
In an exclusive interview with Global Defense Insight (GDI), Marian Majer, Sales and Marketing Director at Virtual Reality Media and former State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, discusses the changing relationship between government and the defence industry, lessons from Europe’s security transformation since 2022, NATO and EU defence cooperation, and the expanding role of synthetic training. Drawing on more than a decade of senior experience in Slovakia’s defence establishment, Majer also shares his perspective on Central and Eastern Europe’s defence industry, procurement challenges, technological change, and the capabilities likely to shape European armed forces over the coming decade.
Having served in senior leadership at Slovakia’s Ministry of Defence, how has your experience in government shaped the way you now view the relationship between defence policy, military requirements, and industry?
Over 15 years of serving in various senior positions at the Ministry of Defence, I have gained a comprehensive understanding of planning, policy-making, and procurement processes within the armed forces. Having experienced multiple changes of government during this time, I have also developed a keen awareness of how political cycles impact these processes.
Public procurement, particularly in the defence sector, is a lengthy process with several implications. On one hand, industry players must factor this timeline into their government engagement strategies and exercise sufficient patience. On the other hand, governments must recognize that products continuously evolve during procurement cycles, risking obsolescence by the time of delivery.
This is why open dialogue regarding technological progress and innovation, driven by an industry that naturally moves faster than the military can track, is crucial to achieving the right outcomes. Consequently, I view continuous, mutual dialogue between industry and government as vital.
What do you consider the most significant changes in European defence planning and military preparedness over the past several years?
The greatest shock to European defence planning was undoubtedly the launch of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022. This act caught many political leaders and military planners surprised, radically altering the trajectory Europe had been following for the next decade.
The urgent need to substantially increase defence spending in Europe, rapidly adjust priorities, and rethink the size and capabilities of national armed forces found Europe unprepared. Although the shift of the U.S. focus away from Europe toward East Asia had been gradually unfolding since 2014, European NATO members failed to assume greater responsibility for their own defence, and making up for lost time is now proving immensely difficult.
While defence planning and policy-making can be adapted relatively quickly, expanding defence industry production takes significantly longer and demands vast financial and human resources. Nevertheless, I believe European leaders have learned key lessons and recognize the necessity of stronger European autonomy and self-reliance when responding to emerging challenges, such as the development of artificial intelligence, both in defence and beyond.
How should smaller and medium-sized European countries balance national defence requirements with deeper NATO and EU defence cooperation?
I do not believe there is currently a fundamental disconnect between defence planning at the national level and that of NATO or the EU. In fact, I would argue that even where overlapping decision-making previously occurred between NATO and the EU, both organizations have streamlined this process through closer coordination and cooperation. While the threats and challenges facing European defence are numerous, nation-states, the EU, and NATO face them equally. After all, it remains “one set of forces.”
A significant challenge I have observed in recent years is the heavy push to advance national industrial priorities through extensive local content requirements in every project. While understandable from a domestic policy perspective, this negatively impacts the ability to achieve greater project standardization across NATO and the EU. To some extent, this can also lead to national defence priorities taking precedence over joint initiatives at the European or Allied level.
Military modernisation increasingly involves not only new platforms but also digitalisation, simulation, AI, and advanced training systems. How important are these technologies to achieving genuine operational readiness?
Military personnel and their level of readiness will always remain the cornerstone of any army’s capabilities, a sentiment shared by every military strategist. New technologies, including the application of AI in training, accelerate the learning curves and preparation that personnel must undergo.
In operational environments, these technologies streamline decision-making not only for front-line soldiers, but also for commanders across all levels of command and control. Ultimately, integrating modern technologies into training directly enhances the overall operational readiness of the armed forces.
From your current perspective in the defence industry, where do you see the greatest gaps between the capabilities armed forces are seeking and what industry is currently able to deliver?
Personally, I do not believe there are currently significant gaps between the capabilities militaries require and what the private sector offers. As I mentioned in my previous answer, it is more a matter of pressure on delivery speed, interoperability, and especially the cost-to-value ratio. Additionally, it comes down to adapting public procurement processes to match the pace of technological progress we are experiencing.
Air defence is a useful example. In the context of the war in Ukraine and the conflict between the US and Iran, the issue is not what Western air defence systems are capable of intercepting, but rather that ammunition stockpiles are severely limited. With two major conflicts occurring simultaneously, industry cannot replenish them fast enough. At the same time, governments fail to make adequate decisions quickly enough to leverage the best of what industry has to offer at any given moment.
Furthermore, conventional technologies, for instance in the aforementioned field of air defence, are becoming financially unsustainable in an era of exponential UAV development. This creates pressure on the defence industry to deliver significantly more cost-effective solutions whose production can easily be scaled up when needed. The same applies to simulation solutions and training. In recent years, armed forces have begun placing considerably greater emphasis on unit training in synthetic environments, as it is primarily cheaper, more effective, and more accessible.
How is synthetic training evolving as modern air and land operations become more technologically complex, networked, and contested?
The exponential growth of technology brings unprecedented possibilities to both combat operations and training methodologies. Full-mission simulators are no longer the exclusive preserve of aviation platforms.
Advances in virtual reality, display technologies, and artificial intelligence have brought full-fledged synthetic training to other domains as well, ranging from individual dismounted soldier training, ground platforms, and unmanned systems, to complex command-and-staff exercises, which are becoming increasingly difficult to execute in physical environments.
What opportunities do you see for Central and Eastern European defence companies to become more deeply integrated into international supply chains and multinational defence programmes?
Many Central and Eastern Europe defence companies are already part of broader European supply chains today, particularly in the context of modernizing national capabilities in both the land and air domains.
It is precisely the combination of a skilled workforce, long-standing industry expertise and know-how in the defence sector, and still relatively competitive labor costs that give CEE companies a distinct advantage within the pan-European market.
Looking toward the next decade, which technological or strategic developments do you believe will have the greatest impact on European armed forces and their approach to training and readiness?
Technological progress and strategic developments in the region are two closely linked, yet fundamentally distinct, dynamics. In today’s tense and unpredictable geopolitical environment, European nations are compelled to invest massive resources into their defence, but how long this state of affairs can be sustained remains questionable. European society has grown accustomed to high living standards and strong social welfare systems; unless the geopolitical situation deteriorates significantly further, governments will be reluctant to maintain defence spending at these levels over the long term.
On the other hand, it is precisely the sharp decline in Europe’s security situation since 2022 that forced militaries to allocate substantially more resources toward training, force-building, and broader societal resilience. This trajectory is unlikely to change in the medium term. Consequently, armed forces will seek new ways to balance the rapid expansion of their capabilities with the costs associated with that growth. As noted earlier, the pressure to find cost-effective solutions will only intensify, forcing both major defence primes and smaller local players to adapt.



