Massimiliano D’Amore on MENA security, proxy warfare and maritime threats

Massimiliano D'Amore on MENA security, proxy warfare and maritime threats

The Middle East’s security landscape is being reshaped by proxy warfare, maritime disruption, drones, missiles and intensifying competition among regional and external powers. In an exclusive interview with Global Defense Insight, geopolitical intelligence analyst Massimiliano D’Amore discusses how these developments are affecting deterrence, energy security and military planning across the MENA region.

D’Amore, founder of The Red Zone, specializes in maritime intelligence, proxy warfare and sanctions, with particular attention to the Red Sea and the movement of sanctioned Iranian and Russian oil. In the interview, he examines evolving threats in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz, as well as the changing role of non-state armed groups and major external powers in regional security.

The Middle East is experiencing a period of rapidly shifting alliances, deterrence dynamics, and regional competition. Which developments do you believe will have the greatest impact on the region’s security architecture over the next three to five years?

The biggest shift, in my view, is that getting oil out of the Gulf now depends on permission. Since May, Iran’s new Persian Gulf Strait Authority has required ships to disclose their ownership, insurance, crew and cargo before it grants a transit permit, and it refuses ships from countries Tehran calls hostile. Washington sanctioned the authority within weeks, so any operator dealing with it takes on sanctions risk. The Houthis apply the same logic to Saudi oil. Their July blockade covers any vessel loading or discharging at a Saudi port, which hits the Yanbu route Riyadh built up to avoid Hormuz; Kpler put Yanbu exports through Bab el-Mandeb at 3.5 million barrels a day in June, against 240,000 a year earlier. If this becomes the norm, Gulf energy security will rest on the consent of the very actors the region’s defenses were built to deter.

I’d also watch the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, which looks weaker than its announcement suggested. A Turkish official says it still needs parliamentary approval in Türkiye and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Foreign Office says no military action against the Houthis is under discussion, and in 2015 Pakistan’s parliament refused Saudi Arabia’s request for troops in Yemen. Islamabad’s contribution so far is about 8,000 troops, fighter jets, drones and air defense inside the kingdom, while Asim Munir keeps his channel to Tehran open. Pakistan relies on Saudi money and Saudi crude, and that dependence is Riyadh’s main pressure point if Houthi strikes on the kingdom continue.

Proxy warfare has long shaped conflicts across the MENA region. How is the role of non-state armed groups evolving as states increasingly combine conventional military power with drones, missiles, cyber capabilities, and information operations?

Armed groups now carry out the attacks that states want to keep deniable. Earlier this month, drones hit pumping infrastructure on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline. Riyadh says they came from Iraq, nobody has claimed the strike, and Saudi Arabia held off retaliating at the Iraqi prime minister’s request. The attacker shut the kingdom’s main bypass around Hormuz and left it with no clean target. The Houthis claim their strikes openly, and their missiles and drones this month hit energy and civilian sites in the kingdom, injuring more than 70 people according to the Saudi government. Both now deliver precision at range, which used to require a state.

In cyber, the blurring runs the other way, with states posing as non-state actors. CyberAv3ngers presented itself as a hacktivist group when it hit Israeli-made Unitronics controllers at US water utilities in 2023; US agencies traced it to the IRGC’s Cyber-Electronic Command, and Treasury sanctioned 6 of that unit’s officials. In April, 6 US agencies warned that Iranian-affiliated actors had caused operational disruption at several US infrastructure organizations. On the information side, the Houthis issue navigation guidance and battlefield claims, such as 9 aircraft shot down, that nobody can check for days, and the silence after the pipeline strike serves the same purpose. Attribution has become the hardest part of the analyst’s job, by design.

The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Strait of Hormuz remain critical to global trade and energy security. What are the most serious emerging threats to maritime security in these areas, and how should governments and commercial operators prepare for them?

The most serious threat is that safe passage now depends on who you are and whom you trade with. In the Red Sea, the Houthis have taken Mokha and Perim, the island that splits Bab el-Mandeb. In July they said they used cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi tankers; from Perim, much cheaper weapons can cover the shipping lane. Their embargo targets any ship loading or discharging at a Saudi port, while they tell everyone else that navigation is safe. Hormuz is harder to read. Iran keeps a list of what it calls non-compliant vessels, which grew to 77 ships this week, and one of them, the El Gaia, was struck in transit this month, with a crew member reported missing.

For shipowners, a lot of the risk now sits in paperwork. Iran’s list spreads by contact, since a ship that does a transfer with a listed vessel can be added too, and Tehran has now warned insurers, P&I clubs and classification societies not to service listed ships. Getting off the list means applying to an authority Washington has sanctioned. In the Red Sea, I’d screen a ship’s recent Saudi port calls as carefully as its flag and owner. The southern Red Sea is an IBF warlike operations area, as Hormuz has been this year, so seafarers can refuse to sail and owners need their consent before fixing the voyage. Governments can help with escorts for the ships the embargo names and with state-backed war risk cover.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated how relatively low-cost drones and missiles can create strategic and economic pressure far beyond the immediate battlefield. How is this changing traditional concepts of deterrence and force protection in the Middle East?

Deterrence by punishment needs an attacker with valuable assets and a clear address, and cheap drones erode both. The 2025 US campaign against the Houthis ended in an Oman-brokered arrangement that covered only US ships, and an attack launched from a third country leaves the victim choosing between retaliation and a diplomatic crisis. So the weight is shifting to denial, which means convincing the attacker that a strike won’t produce the economic effect it wants. When a pumping station on Saudi Arabia’s East-West line was hit in April, Riyadh said full capacity was back within 3 days, and that kind of recovery lowers the payoff of the next attack.

Force protection is changing too. Interceptors cost far more than the drones they bring down, and a destroyer can’t easily reload its missile cells at sea, so militaries are pushing cheaper tools, such as guns, electronic warfare, directed energy and interceptor drones, to handle most of the threat and saving missiles for ballistic and cruise attacks. The other change is scope. Most of what gets hit is civilian and spread over hundreds of kilometers, like pipelines, terminals and tankers, and no air defense network can cover all of it. Protection therefore also means hardening key sites, keeping spare parts close by and having more than one export route.

Intelligence analysts are often required to work with incomplete, conflicting, or deliberately manipulated information. What methodologies do you consider most important when assessing fast-moving conflicts and separating credible intelligence from noise?

I start with provenance: where a claim first appeared, who benefits from it, and whether the reports I’m reading are independent or echoes of one source. Every source gets an Admiralty grade for its reliability and for the credibility of the specific item, and I keep observation and inference apart in writing. Physical evidence does most of the checking: geolocation and chronolocation, satellite radar and optical imagery, thermal detections, AIS data read for gaps and spoofing, and official notices to mariners and airmen.

Structured techniques keep my own reasoning honest. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses is the one I use most, because evidence consistent with every explanation tells me nothing. A key assumptions check makes me write down what the judgment depends on, and indicators with thresholds fixed in advance stop me from fitting the analysis to the story. For every judgment I also write down what would prove me wrong, so I know what to watch for. Before publishing, I build the strongest case against my main judgment through devil’s advocacy or a premortem, and I state the result in calibrated probability language.

How do you assess the growing involvement of major external powers in the Middle East? Are we moving toward a more multipolar regional security environment in which the United States, China, Russia, and European states will play increasingly different roles?

Yes. Each outside power now brings something different, and the balance is uneven. The United States still holds escalation dominance: the bases, the air and missile defense network the Gulf relies on, and dollar sanctions it can aim at anyone who helps Iran. China is Tehran’s economic lifeline as the main buyer of its crude, supports Pakistan’s mediation and stays away from security guarantees; I expect its influence to grow through reconstruction money. Russia has helped Iran with intelligence and targeting data, which the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has confirmed, but the war in Ukraine limits how far it can go. Europe works mainly through sanctions, including the UN measures the E3 restored in 2025, and through its naval mission in the Red Sea.

Security guarantees are multiplying and getting less clear: the region’s newest defense pact has no published text, so nobody knows exactly what would trigger it, and that raises the risk of miscalculation. Sanctions are contested, with Washington designating and Chinese buyers carrying on, and shipowners, insurers and banks left to manage the gap. Militaries are mixing suppliers as well, with Gulf air defense built on US systems while Saudi Arabia buys Turkish and Chinese drones, which makes integration harder. My read is that the region is already multipolar in practice, with the US still dominant when force is needed, and crisis management feels the strain first.

Looking ahead, which conflict, geopolitical flashpoint, or security trend in the MENA region do you believe is currently underestimated but deserves much greater attention from policymakers and the defense community?

I’d point to the Houthi arms supply, because it decides how long everything else in the Red Sea can go on. The drones hitting Saudi Arabia and shipping are increasingly put together in Yemen from ordinary commercial parts, bought abroad through front companies and paid for through local exchange houses. Washington has sanctioned almost every link in that chain. The clearest case Treasury describes of a shipment being stopped, though, came from a physical check: Yemeni government authorities found 52 Kornet missiles hidden inside fake generators in 2022.

That kind of check is exactly what the new coast is missing. The UN inspection mechanism only covers ships heading to Hodeidah and Salif, and it can’t stop anyone who doesn’t come forward. Mokha and the coast south of it stayed outside that system while the government held them. Now they’re in Houthi hands, a short dhow crossing from Eritrea and Djibouti. The Security Council isn’t united on the problem either. If inspection doesn’t follow the front line, and sanctions don’t reach the people who will run those ports, I expect the Houthis to rebuild their stocks faster than any bombing campaign can wear them down.

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