South Korea has spent more than five decades reducing its dependence on foreign weapons. Such an effort resulted in one of the most successful defense-industrial transformations. Nowadays, South Korea exports tanks, self-propelled howitzers, aircraft, missile systems, submarines, and radars.
Nonetheless, the next step for self-reliance would be more difficult than the previous steps.
The key problem is not whether South Korea could simply produce weapons indigenously. It is whether South Korea can continue to manufacture those weapons even when other countries cut off a critical material, component, or production process buried several tiers down the supply line.
From Foreign Weapons to Indigenous Production
In the 1970s, South Korea’s weakness was relatively easy to discern. South Korea lacked the capabilities to manufacture many basic weapons indigenously, while being heavily dependent on American military assistance. The Nixon Doctrine and the withdrawal of the US 7th Infantry Division intensified fears about overreliance on Washington. In response, Seoul established the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and began domestic production of rifles, ammunition, artillery, and other miscellaneous basic weapons.
The solution was fundamentally a state-driven industrialization. The South Korean government designated defense firms, guaranteed demand, financed production capacity, introduced foreign technologies, and aligned defense manufacturing with a broader heavy and chemical industry drive.
By the 1980s, the problem had changed. Although South Korea was increasingly able to manufacture major platforms, critical technologies and subsystems remained foreign. K1 tanks symbolized such characteristics: South Korea was able to manufacture modern tanks, yet they reflected substantial foreign technologies, including German engines and transmissions and US-origin fire-control and sighting technologies.
The weakness was nonetheless visible. Seoul was generally aware of which foreign companies or governments controlled the technology it needed. Hence, the response could include license production, technology transfer, offset agreements, supplier diversification, or long-term indigenous development.
During the 1990s, South Korea moved further toward indigenous design and more advanced systems, including submarines, aircraft, precision weapons, and command-and-control capacity. The objective was no longer simply to produce foreign-designed weapons in South Korea but to increasingly secure sophisticated technologies and lower dependence on a limited number of suppliers.
In the 2000s, such an approach was more institutionalized. Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), which was established in 2006, expanded efforts to localize components and develop critical technologies. With the passage of time, South Korea became increasingly capable of replacing imported subsystems with domestically produced ones. The strategy functioned astonishingly well. However, it also created new problems: components manufactured in South Korea are not necessarily strategically independent components.
When Dependence Moves Down the Supply Chain
Even if South Korean companies indigenously produce actuators for missiles, they could be dependent on important permanent magnets. The magnets may depend on rare-earth materials separated and refined in China. Likewise, while using domestically designed electronic equipment, South Korean radars could be dependent on foreign semiconductor materials, fabrication processes, or special production equipment. Therefore, dependence has moved downwards.
This is precisely why the current supply chain challenge differs from that of the 1970s and 1980s. In the past, dependence was centered on completed weapons, major subsystems, or identifiable foreign technologies. Today, the core vulnerability may sit inside a third- or fourth-tier supplier that neither main contractors nor governments traditionally considered strategically important.
China makes this particularly dangerous. Beijing’s control over rare-earth materials, germanium, gallium, and related materials illustrates how critical inputs can become an instrument of economic coercion. As for South Korea, weapons systems that are most likely to be exposed are those that depend heavily on electronics, sensors, precision motors, actuators, optical systems, and advanced materials.
This means that guided munitions and sensors deserve greater attention than conventional measures of localization would suggest. Cheongung-II interceptors, Chunmoo guided rocket and missiles, other guided missiles, AESA radar, electronic warfare systems, EO/IR equipment, and parts of the KF-21’s supply chain could be more susceptible to restrictions on rare-earth magnets, semiconductor materials, and special metals than conventional artillery shells and comparatively mechanical platforms.
Even within identical weapons systems, vulnerability could widely differ. For instance, Chunmoo’s launcher itself would be able to continuously be churned out, but shortages could arise in the guidance, navigation, control, or actuator components required for its precision-guided rockets and missiles. The localization ratio that only touches the surface may not be able to detect these distinctions.
From Localization to Denial Resilience
South Korea should therefore move away from treating the aggregate localization ratio as the primary measure for defense-industrial resilience. As an alternative, DAPA should establish a classified Defense Supply Chain Chokepoint List, which includes major weapons like K2, K9, Chunmoo, Chungeong-II, FA-50, KF-21, submarines, and naval combat systems. The government should track critical dependencies all the way to sub-suppliers and identify precisely which foreign-controlled inputs could completely halt production.
The core indicator should be the number of chokepoints that could suspend production, rather than the percentage of domestically produced content. Heightening a platform’s localization rate from 90 to 92 percent would add almost no strategic value if the remaining 8 percent includes a single imported material or component without which the weapon cannot be completed. In that sense, a meaningful objective would be to reduce these chokepoints from dozens to a handful and ultimately eliminate them if feasible.
To be sure, this does not mean that South Korea should attempt to produce every category of materials and components domestically. It would be economically inefficient and, in some cases, technically unrealistic. Instead, the South Korean government should distinguish between items that must be produced domestically, items that could be acquired through a trusted allied supply chain, and items for which import diversification and stockpiling offer sufficient protection.
Meanwhile, strategic stockpiling also needs to become sophisticated. Accumulating raw ore would have limited value if South Korea does not have the refining, processing, or manufacturing capacity to convert raw ore into a practically usable form. In the case of some materials, the appropriate reserve for stockpiling may be refined metals or alloys. For others, it may be finished permanent magnets, optical materials, authorized semiconductors, sensors, or complete subcomponents that could be immediately inserted into the production line.
Economic matters are equally important. Even if South Korea’s rare-earth magnet production companies or defense-semiconductor facilities are strategically indispensable, they could be commercially uncompetitive if Chinese suppliers could offer the same items at much lower prices during normal periods. In that context, a one-time subsidy could help construct factories, yet it cannot guarantee that these factories will still exist a decade later.
Hence, as for genuinely critical materials and components, Seoul should review multi-year purchase commitments, minimum-volume guarantees, strategic stockpile purchases, and temporary price-support mechanisms. These measures should be confined to a small number of explicitly regulated chokepoints and should be aligned with production targets, emergency surge capacity, and regular competitive review. The key objective should be securing resilience, rather than permanent protection of favored companies.
South Korea should also not confuse self-reliance with autarky. In many areas, the most realistic solution may be a credible multinational supply chain. For instance, Australian or Canadian minerals could be aligned with Japanese or South Korean refining and processing, followed by South Korea’s component production. Meanwhile, long-term offtake agreements with American and European defense firms could help create enough demand to make these facilities commercially sustainable.
Lastly, alternative sources must be qualified before crises erupt. It is not enough to identify non-Chinese magnets, semiconductors, or optical materials after exports have already been restricted. If a replacement needs redesigning, testing, and military certification, delays could occur for years. Thus, South Korea should require at least two qualified sources for the most critical production-stoppage inputs wherever technically feasible.
South Korea’s defense industry has been established by overcoming visible dependence on foreign weapons. The next challenge is more difficult since dependence is increasingly being hidden inside platforms.
The 1970s question was whether South Korea could indigenously manufacture rifles instead of importing them. In the 1980s and 1990s, the key challenge was to produce major platforms and acquire the technologies behind them. In the 2000s, the focus shifted towards localizing sophisticated components.
In the 2020s, the standard for properly evaluating self-reliance should, once again, shift. The key question is no longer simply how much of a weapon is made in South Korea. It is whether foreign governments could prevent South Korea from manufacturing those weapons.

Table of Contents
ToggleDr. Ju Hyung Kim
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim serves as President of the Security Management Institute, a defense-focused think tank affiliated with South Korea’s National Assembly. He has contributed to numerous defense initiatives and has advised key institutions, including the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff.



