The advent of hypersonic weapons has revealed a critical vulnerability in traditional missile Defense. While interception mechanisms work effectively against traditional ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles have unpredictable trajectories due to their speed, manoeuvrability, and low-altitude flight. The emerging dilemma is not simply whether an incoming missile can be intercepted, but whether it can be detected, tracked, and targeted continuously enough to allow interception. This has led to a paradigm shift from interception-based missile Defense to persistent sensing and networked targeting.
This is reflected in the US approach. The US Space Development Agency is designing a Tracking Layer to deliver persistent global detection and tracking of hypersonic missile threats. The architecture aims to design Low Earth Orbit satellite constellation for space-based infrared sensing and integrate it with the C3 (Command, Control, and Communication) network and ground-based weapons. This Tracking Layer is a key foundational component of the US Golden Dome architecture. Similarly, countries like Russia, South Korea, India, and Israel, among others, are developing a growing constellation of military reconnaissance satellites, experimenting with early-warning payloads, and integrating these capabilities into national missile Defense architectures.
Nevertheless, these developments introduce a new vulnerability as sensor network becomes an active part of the battlefield. Satellites, data links, command networks, and processing nodes are now potential targets for disruption. In missile Defense, the value of an interceptor highly depends on the quality of the information it receives. If the defender loses possession of the target, even a technologically advanced interceptor will have limited utility. This way, the effectiveness of space-based missile Defense system will depend upon the resilience of its entire sensor-to-shooter chain rather than the performance of satellites in isolation.
On top of that, while space offers a particularly appealing solution for information dominance, the role of satellites is limited to detection and, that too, at a very high cost. Although satellites can circumvent the geographical constraints of ground-based sensors, they are increasingly vulnerable to communication jamming. A state does not need to eliminate the interceptor architecture of the adversary but simply weaken the information architecture that enables detection. This largely brings into question the cost-benefit ratio of expensive space-based missile Defense.
Moreover, space-based missile Defense might encourage weaponisation of outer space, resulting in arms race, reduced strategic stability, and lower deterrence thresholds. It does not only fall in a legal grey area but also creates significant challenges for international humanitarian law. Therefore, at the strategic level, space-based missile Defense represents more of a mirage than a genuine game changer.
For these reasons, Pakistan is instead focusing on integrated, multidomain capabilities to detect and counter incoming threats without spending exorbitant costs or violating international laws and norms. The May 2025 Pakistan-India war proved that multidomain kill-chain integration is the key to winning modern air battles. Expert analysis of the Pakistan-India air battle highlights the role of integrated ground-based radars, airborne early-warning aircraft, fighter aircraft, and datalinks as a key aspect of Pakistan’s capability to conduct long-range engagements. According to Michael Dahm, Senior Research Fellow of the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies, it was the effectiveness of Pakistan’s kill chain that mattered more than the nature of the platforms.
The May 2025 war demonstrated that Pakistan can challenge a technologically advanced and networked battlefield by attacking the adversary’s kill chain logic. While India may procure or develop expensive space-based tracking systems, Pakistan can neutralise its strategic impact by augmenting capabilities that can attack, confuse, disrupt, or overload the information architecture that adversaries rely on for missile Defense.
During Marka-e-Haq, Pakistan neutralised several of India’s incoming missiles through soft kill capabilities. To stay at par with global and adversary developments, Pakistan is further enhancing its EW and cyber capabilities. These capabilities serve as integral, non-kinetic means for contesting space-enabled missile Defense architectures. Rather than physically destroying satellites, EW and cyber can degrade the communications, navigation, and sensor links on which integrated detection, tracking, and interception depend.
Interestingly, this new missile Defense competition is not just a race between missiles and interceptors, or between satellites and missiles; it is in fact a battle of kill chains. Space-based sensors may determine who sees first, but network resilience and counter-network capabilities will increasingly determine who can convert that visibility into a successful engagement. Pakistan’s experience in May 2025 war proved that an integrated kill chain can be used to counter a technologically advanced opponent without being outnumbered or outclassed. As missile Defense moves into space, maintaining deterrence will rely on the ability to carry this message from the air domain to the broader architecture of modern warfare.
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ToggleMaheera Munir
Maheera Munir is a researcher at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore, Pakistan. She can be reached at info@casslhr.com.




