Strategic maritime chokepoints have become increasingly important instruments of geopolitical competition, with disruptions to critical shipping routes threatening global energy supplies, international trade, and national security. The Strait of Hormuz remains a focal point of regional tensions, highlighting how strategic waterways can be used as instruments of political and economic coercion. For energy-dependent countries such as Pakistan, these developments expose vulnerabilities in energy security while raising questions about alternative supply routes, the strategic potential of Gwadar Port, and regional energy diversification.
In an exclusive interview with Global Defense Insight (GDI), Dr. Muhammad Shareh Qazi, an international security analyst, examines the geopolitics of maritime chokepoints and their implications for Pakistan’s energy security. Speaking with Fatima Faisal, Dr. Qazi discusses Iran’s strategic use of the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy supplies, and the challenges facing Gwadar Port. He also explores the prospects of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline and whether alternative energy corridors can strengthen Pakistan’s long-term energy resilience and strategic autonomy.
Some IR scholars argue that economic interdependence makes chokepoint weaponization costly because the blocker also suffers economically. Does this mean mutual dependence has made chokepoints less useful as coercive tools than classical geopolitics assumes?
The weightage of financial cost against political goals is often the point of concern and debate when evaluating costs for weaponizing strategic chokepoints. In fact, by adding the word ‘strategic’ to a natural landscape actually means that it holds more political value than its status quo condition. States have always resorted to ‘blockade’ or ‘quarantine’ measures in geostrategy so equating it to merely an economic cost-benefit may not be the only principal consideration for a state exerting power and influence.
For decades, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz without fully following through, including during the Iran–Iraq War, Gulf Wars, and the June 2025 Israel–Iran conflict. Does Iran’s move to close the Strait in early 2026 mark a shift from psychological deterrence toward actual physical weaponization?
The current policy of using Strait of Hormuz and its subsequent blockade as a tool for diplomatic coercion is not a new phenomenon in naval warfare, especially in the region under discussion. Despite not being a complete closure, the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis by the US against Iran was a similar instance in the same region that indicates this is a natural course of action, not a subsequent realization. A shift would then not be a new paradigm shift but a time-tested strategic manoeuvre.
Pakistan’s power and gas circular debt is now over Rs 5.2 trillion, alongside high transmission and distribution losses. Given these domestic weaknesses, are Hormuz-type disruptions Pakistan’s biggest energy risk, or do they mainly expose and worsen problems already existing within the energy system?
Pakistan is a net importer of hydrocarbon fuels and its main dependence on Middle East based petrochemicals is also a continued challenge. However, seeking alternate locations is an issue that involves logistical challenges, operating cost for such supply chain and global political concerns that it cannot circumvent or ignore. So yes, it does worsen the situation for Pakistan and locating alternates and/or substitutes would then be difficult to accomplish.
Gwadar was partly developed to provide China and Pakistan an alternative to the Strait of Malacca, yet it handled only around 8,300 containers in 2025 and has not become a major energy corridor. Why has Gwadar not reached its expected potential despite years of CPEC-linked investment?
Gwadar requires a stable and industrially linked population base that Balochistan has not yet offered. Although there is potential to connect it nationally, the time it takes for a port to fully develop and function at optimal efficiency is significant and requires consistent investment and adaption policies which Gwadar has yet to receive.
If Gwadar eventually becomes a major energy route, could it simply shift Pakistan’s dependency from Gulf suppliers toward China rather than reduce it? In that case, does route diversification necessarily mean greater strategic diversification?
Being an energy route may be able to guarantee a smooth flow of petrochemicals and hydrocarbons from near access markets but the dependency shift may not be viable due to supply chain convenience with Gulf and proximity of access. Route diversification through Gwadar impacts the Gulf states more than it does to Pakistan but for strategic diversification, Pakistan would experience a significant shift.
TAPI has faced decades of delays due to security, financing, and regional political challenges, but construction of the Afghan section is now progressing and gas supplies could begin in 2027. How realistic is TAPI as a reliable long-term part of Pakistan’s energy diversification strategy?
Central Asia has always been regarded as an important energy supplier for South Asia where TAPI and CASA-1000 projects have received significant praise and hope with respect to policy and practicality. TAPI is an important project and promises to be a long term solution but it remains contingent on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations more than Central Asia’s ability to maintain a steady supply of affordable petrochemicals, hydrocarbons and other energy resources to Pakistan.



