Following the end of the crisis between India and Pakistan in May 2025, a so-called “Navy-First” logic has been gaining prominence in the Indian military sphere. This change has unfolded in the wake of what was generally seen as an outclassing defeat in May 2025 conflict. Such a touching view came into the view by the Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement who said that “Next time, the opening will be done by our navy.” It was a politically confident remark but creating no strategic sobriety. It is impossible to avoid feeling that Indian leadership is in the grip of hyper-nationalistic chest-thumping, which is disorienting strategic analysis with theatrical determination.
This is evident by historical facts. Back in 2019 Indo-Pak crisis, when two Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets were shot down by Pakistan Air Force (PAF), the Prime Minister of India stated, “had the Rafale jets been there, the result would have been different.” Similar statements were given regarding S-400 long-range air-defense system. But when crisis erupted again in May 2025, it was once again IAF which was collecting the wreckage of its multiple fighter aircrafts, including prestigious Rafale fighter jets downed by PAF in one of the largest beyond-visual-range (VR) combat in history. Similarly, the highly appreciated S-400 battery, which was supposed to deny Indian airspace to Pakistan, was also put out-of-action when its radar was knocked out by PAF. Considering these examples, gauging combat prowess of Indian Armed Forces, including Indian Navy, purely from numerical strength or technical capabilities of its military equipment, is a defective practice to say the least.
Thus, recent political assertion by Indian leadership can be dismissed as bravado, but taken at face value, is strategically cost-heavy, militarily reckless, and politically inexcusable. The mythic notion about supposed ‘naval supremacy’ that is pervading the thinking of the Indian strategic planners is a grossly unsound fiction. Indian planners seem to be lost in what can be called ‘stuck-in-history syndrome,’ which highlights certain ‘successes’ of the past and creates misperceptions about once’s own capabilities as well as the potential of the opponent. The 1971 war between India and Pakistan is often used as the rationale behind New Delhi’s self-imposed confidence in naval front. But this comparison is no longer valid in contemporary era.
Fast-forward to the episode of May 2025 and the myth is more unpacked. Although rhetoric was aggressive, but ground reality was very different. INS Vikrant – the indigenously developed air-craft carrier of India, remained at least 400 nautical miles off the Karachi coast. It was not a chance distance, nor did it emanate from goodwill restraint. It was predetermined by the threat perception. We are living in the age of long-range missiles, and proximity, particularly in naval domain is powerlessness. The naval warfare has been completely transformed by long-range vectors, integrated real time ISR, unmanned systems, and artificial intelligence (AI), for effective conduct of multi-domain operation in a network centric environment. The carrier-centric prestige which was the stamp of dominance previously turned into a liability in narrow seas like the Arabian Sea. This is even more dangerous when it is to be executed against the state of just 1001 kms of coastline with a navy capable of employing long-range vectors from surface, air, sub-surface, and land.
This poses an inherent contradiction, that unless India runs the risk of a more maritime posture when a real crisis occurs, how does a ‘Navy-First’ opening come to pass so abruptly in the future? It is not the strategy that answers the question, but rather psychology.
There is confusion in Indian strategic discourse today on deterrent signaling and operational viability. Politicians tend to believe that an escalation through sea is a more secure, less unpredictable rung than one through air and land. This is a precariously false assumption. Naval warfare does not provide better control over escalation ladder; it undermines it. The hostilities are no longer bilateral or limited when the maritime assets are turned into the means of their start.
In contrast to air skirmishes or localized exchange on the ground, the naval confrontation can rapidly internationalize the crisis. Maritime infrastructure and commercial shipping passageway – serving as channels of connectivity for fulfilling global economic and energy demands, can easily become vulnerable thus risking global ramifications. Insurance rates increase more rapidly than ceasefire solutions. Energy markets respond more quickly than diplomats sitting down. Any conflict would automatically constitute an invitation to foreign pressures, diplomatic backlash, economic repercussions, or even military intervention. China and U.S. have enormous stakes in the Arabian Sea. Any disruption here will be seen by them as a flagrant disruption to their own maritime and security interests. What may be seen at home by Indian leaders as muscular deterrence would be seen abroad as reckless destabilization.
Such an escalation would be disastrous in the South Asian situation, where both India and Pakistan are economically weak and regionally involved. Consider the fact, India’s Kandla port lies next to Karachi port, and most of India’s oil shipments arrive at this port. Will India even risk its temporary closure? Never mind the complete annihilation of it which could in fact, wreck its economy. If sea-based escalation occurs, India would be the actor to suffer most of the consequences. Given new Delhi’s self-claimed so-called great power status, this self-triggered recklessness could be a final nail in its economy’s coffin.
In addition, the Indian planners do not fully comprehend the naval prowess of Pakistan. Pakistan does not want sea control; it wants sea denial. This differentiation is important. Sea denial is asymmetric, economically effective, and defensive in nature. Submarines, anti-ship missiles, naval mines, unmanned systems, and saturation tactics are all enough to make a disproportionate burden on a numerically large navy. Consider the fact, since the invasion of Ukraine or what Moscow termed as a ‘special military operation’ has started, it has left nearly 1/3rdof Russian Black Sea Fleet out of commission by Ukrainian military, through the use of a myriad of inexpensive drones, ballistic missiles, and precision cruise missiles. The innovative pioneer in this kind of environment does not take initiative but rather takes on risky elements.
In the contemporary war, escalation dominance is no longer determined by purely military aspects. Equally crucial are diplomatic legitimacy, financial stability, and the ability to dictate the information. The doctrine of ‘Navy-First’s compromises each of the three.
The statement of Rajnath Singh cannot be understood as a consistent war-fighting doctrine. It can be more aptly described as post-crisis compensation a bid to reclaim dominance in an area that has been assumed to be a safe haven, easy to manage and symbolically inclinations. There is a worse every-day lesson in history. Wars are oblivious to domains of choice. Political slogans have no power over escalation. Opponents fail to fit domestic narrative requirements.
A ‘Navy-First opening’ in South Asia will not show strength rather it will forfeit escalation control, invite asymmetric retaliation, internationalize the conflict, and compress decision-making time in a nuclearized environment. It is not strategy: its strategic suicide. If somehow, the conflict erupts and naval escalation follows, it will be the most cognitively irrational decision taken by India in recent times.
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ToggleAhmad Ibrahim
Author is Research Associate at Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.
Muhammad Mahad Samija
Muhammad Mahad Samija is a student at the Department of Political Science, Government College University Lahore.



