Subsea cable security has become an increasingly important issue in international security discussions, particularly as governments seek to protect critical communications infrastructure from cyber threats, physical sabotage and grey-zone activities. In an exclusive interview with Global Defense Insight (GDI), Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory and author of “Securing the Seabed: A Canada–Japan Strategy for Undersea Cable Resilience,” discusses the importance of strengthening Canada–Japan defence cooperation to protect undersea communications networks.
Speaking with GDI interviewer Asanda Hadebe, Miller outlines the need for a permanent bilateral working group, coordinated responses to suspected cable interference and stronger cybersecurity standards. He also examines Arctic governance challenges, emergency cable repair arrangements, international cooperation and the potential role of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and artificial intelligence in monitoring critical subsea infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions.
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ToggleWhat would make the working group different from existing Canada-Japan intelligence sharing?
“Existing arrangements are mostly episodic and classified, and they sit inside broader security channels. A permanent working group would be operational and cross-sector. It would put government, cable owners, telecom operators and repair firms at the same table, with a standing mandate for joint planning, exercises and incident playbooks. Intelligence sharing tells you what happened. This body would help both countries decide what to do about it.”
How should Canada and Japan attribute and respond to ambiguous, grey-zone incidents?
“Attribution will rarely be clean, so I’d stop waiting for certainty. Agree in advance on shared forensic standards and a common evidence-sharing protocol, so both governments can reach a coordinated assessment quickly. Then respond in tiers: diplomatic signaling, coordinated public statements, targeted sanctions or vessel-related measures, and faster repair. The aim is to raise the cost of deniable sabotage without escalating to a military response.”
What are the Arctic governance gaps, and how do you address them before new infrastructure is built?
“The Arctic Council doesn’t handle security. UNCLOS covers cables, but enforcement is thin, and there’s no dedicated regime for Arctic cable protection. Repair capacity is scarce, and sovereignty and jurisdiction questions, including over the Northwest Passage, complicate things. The window to act is now, while routes are still being planned. Canada and Japan can build resilience standards, route diversity and shared repair logistics into the design, working with Arctic partners and Indigenous communities.”
How should cable cybersecurity fit into broader critical infrastructure protection?
“Treat landing stations and network management systems as designated critical infrastructure, with mandatory cyber standards, incident reporting and regular testing. Both countries should also join up their cyber agencies and their maritime and telecom regulators, since these risks cross all three. Shared threat intelligence with private operators matters most, because they own and run most of this infrastructure.”
What are the obstacles to standby repair agreements, and how can they be overcome?
“The main obstacles are cost, since keeping vessels on standby is expensive, plus a very small global repair fleet, commercial confidentiality and liability concerns. Governments can help by underwriting retainer fees, pooling demand across allies, and offering legal certainty and port access. Once the terms are clear, operators have a real business case.”
Which international forums should they use to promote norms against intentional cable interference?
“They should work through several forums at once. The International Cable Protection Committee and the ITU handle the technical and industry side, while the IMO covers maritime behavior. On the political side, they can use the G7, the Quad and ASEAN-linked mechanisms, and press for clearer interpretation of UNCLOS obligations. They can also lead by example, adopting best practices at home and building a coalition of like-minded states around them.”
What is the state of AUV and AI-enabled anomaly detection technology, and how soon could it be deployed?
“AUVs are mature for survey and inspection but still limited in endurance, communications and persistent monitoring. AI-enabled anomaly detection, including analysis of fiber-sensing data, is promising but still moving from pilots to operations. In the Indo-Pacific, I’d expect limited operational use within a few years. The Arctic will take longer because of ice cover, extreme conditions and sparse infrastructure. So the priority is joint testing and trials now, so the tools are ready when the threat requires them.”



