The F-35 Deal between Germany and the United States: Rethinking Dependence in Transatlantic Defense Cooperation

The F-35 Deal between Germany and the United States: Rethinking Dependence in Transatlantic Defense Cooperation

Just recently, Germany’s Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, received the first F-35A Lightning II combat aircraft for the German Air Force from manufacturer Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth. The aircraft represents a major upgrade for the Luftwaffe, featuring stealth characteristics, advanced sensor technology, and the ability to process large volumes of data. While the first eight F-35s will be handed over in autumn 2026, the deal is expected to be completed by 2029 – the same year in which the German armed forces are planned to be fully capable of defending the country against aggression. The aircraft will also provide the German contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the F-35 deal is part of a broader package of major US-German procurement projects, including the CH-47F Chinook, P-8A Poseidon and Patriot systems, worth more than 30 billion US dollars. Pistorius described the F-35 delivery as evidence of the “strength of the transatlantic partnership and successful cooperation between Germany and the USA.” These questions matter at a time when Germany is seeking to strengthen its own defense capabilities while European governments are reassessing their reliance on the United States. The F-35 illustrates this tension: it can improve Germany’s ability to contribute to NATO operations, but its long-term effectiveness also depends on a complex international support and supply network from the US. The central question is therefore not simply whether the F-35 is an advanced combat aircraft, but how much strategic freedom Germany and the other countries signing the contract will retain once it enters service. The programme offers a case study in the tension between military capability and strategic autonomy.

The F-35A is widely regarded as one of the world’s most advanced combat aircraft. The aircraft features highly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities. It is difficult for enemy sensors to detect the F-35A; thanks to its stealth characteristics, adversaries have a much harder time detecting the aircraft, a capability enabled by its shape, internal weapons bays, and specialized surface coating. It also offers long-range precision-strike capabilities, allowing it to engage targets at considerable distances. In addition, the airplane fits perfectly into the alliance: it is designed to share information with other platforms and allies, making it more than a lone armed system. The F-35A is intended to replace the Tornado to maintain the nuclear deterrence role. For Germany, the F-35 will therefore provide a significant new capability for NATO deterrence, while also strengthening interoperability with the other F-35 operators. However, these capabilities are only valuable if the aircraft can be maintained, supplied and kept operational over the long term. This raises a question that goes beyond the F-35’s technical performance: how dependent will Germany be on the systems and support structures required to operate it? Plus, how much strategic independence within a military alliance is actually possible and sensible?

According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the F-35A is by no means flawless. Shortages of spare parts, corrosion issues, and maintenance challenges were identified in the U.S. fleet during fiscal year 2025. The GAO also reported a decline in the Full Mission Capable rate to 25%, while delays in modernization remain an additional concern. Although these problems have been documented in U.S. reports, the German Luftwaffe must ensure the long-term operational availability of its aircraft. Another critical issue concerns the contractual framework. Under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedure, Germany signed the agreement with the U.S. government rather than directly with the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin. Even after delivery, the United States remains involved in maintenance and spare parts supply, with the initial support arrangement limited to five years. According to an internal report by the German Ministry of Defense on armaments, Germany has no legal entitlement to carry out certain support services independently. The U.S. side stipulates the contractual terms and is non-negotiable, while the agreement also provides for unilateral termination by the United States. This raises the question of what options would remain available to Germany in the event of supply interruptions, political disputes, or a lack of technical support. It is therefore worth questioning whether the German government’s commitment to providing whatever is necessary to strengthen defense capabilities adequately accounts for these risks. The battlefields of Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated how air power and the ability to counter aerial threats continue to shape modern warfare. However, acquiring advanced aircraft alone does not guarantee operational effectiveness; long-term availability and reliable support are equally essential.

As noted earlier, Germany participates in NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. The United States retains control of its nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, while participating allies provide suitable aircraft and supporting capabilities. The F-35 is therefore not merely the result of an American procurement decision but part of an established alliance framework. Strategic and political autonomy must be distinguished across areas such as operational freedom of action, technical support, industrial control, and political decision-making. The challenge is balancing the development and management of national capabilities with the need for cooperation within the alliance. The term “dependence” should therefore be used carefully. NATO is built on shared responsibilities and commitments, and cooperation does not automatically amount to dependence. The United States, like its European allies, is committed to contributing to collective defense. Nevertheless, formal equality among allies does not mean that all states possess the same capabilities or the same degree of control over critical military systems. The central question is how Germany can preserve sufficient freedom of action while fulfilling its commitments within NATO.

The existing transatlantic military infrastructure must also be considered. Ramstein, which hosts U.S. Air Forces in Europe and NATO air command structures, illustrates Germany’s role not merely as a host for American military facilities, but as a key hub for allied operations. Multinational exercises establish common procedures, improve interoperability, and foster personal and institutional ties between armed forces. Air Defender 2023, hosted by Germany, was one example of this cooperation in practice. These arrangements have developed over decades, dating back to the Cold War, and have endured multiple changes of government on both sides of the Atlantic. Although political disagreements may strain relations between governments, they do not automatically dissolve shared security interests or the military structures already in place. Both countries, as well as the alliance, benefit from established infrastructure, coordinated training, and the ability to operate together.

All in all, we must rethink the concept of dependence. With defence procurements within NATO existing for decades, dependence is not necessarily negative; it should rather be understood as cooperation from which both sides benefit. However, the Trump administration’s confrontational approach towards European allies should not be underestimated. Political disagreements may raise questions about the reliability of established security commitments; such threats should be taken seriously but not feared. The F-35 is a continuation of the integration of both Germany and the US; political tensions do not automatically eliminate shared geopolitical interests. Nevertheless, the conditions of cooperation remain important. Decisions should not be driven by political pressure or a sense of obligation to purchase American equipment. Partnership should involve mutual interests and responsibilities, even if both countries do not possess equal capabilities or control over the systems involved. Finally, it must be ensured that the F-35 delivers its promised capabilities despite the challenges mentioned earlier. The expected timeline towards operational readiness around 2029 makes long-term preparation particularly important. The F-35 deal should therefore not automatically be interpreted as making Germany dependent on the United States, but rather as an integration into existing NATO structures in which each ally contributes to collective defense. While its technical and political shortcomings must be taken seriously, the deal has the potential to strengthen the alliance if it delivers the promised capabilities.

 

 

Sources:

  1. Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg). “Pistorius officially takes delivery of first F-35A fighter jet for the Bundeswehr.” Source: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/uebergabezeremonie-erster-f-35-kampfjet-6155772
  2. “US Arms Deals: Expensive Contracts Tying the Bundeswehr to the United States.” Source:

https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/f-35-kampfflugzeug-usa-ruestung-geschaeft-bundeswehr-100.html

  1. “NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces. Source: https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/natos-nuclear-deterrence-policy-and-forces
  2. “Germany Takes Delivery of First F-35A from Lockheed Martin.” Source: https://www.hartpunkt.de/deutschland-uebernimmt-erste-f-35a-von-lockheed-martin/

 

Joshua Kurzer

Table of Contents

Joshua Kurzer

Researcher focusing on European security, defence policy, and transatlantic relations, with a particular interest in EU defence industrial cooperation.

Share this post :

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *