While a number of state-owned and private firms are contributing to India’s ongoing military modernisation drive, the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) however remains at the centre of New Delhi’s Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. As India’s premier state-owned aerospace manufacturer, the HAL has been entrusted with advancing indigenous aeronautics production; thereby reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and increasing prospects for foreign exports of aeronautical systems. Following persistent delays and technological limitations in HAL’s flagship Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas fighter aircraft project, the HAL now appears to be placing renewed hopes in the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) Prachand to demonstrate its growing capabilities in indigenous aerospace production. As of June 2026, the HAL is outsourcing the machining of critical Prachand components to private firms while it is also investing in dedicated production facilities and assembly lines to bolster the production of Prachand and other indigenous helicopters.
While the Prachand may may be positioned as an alternative to the Tejas, however, their production dynamics are quite different ball games. As compared to fighter jets, the manufacturing of attack helicopters is technologically and logistically easier. Therefore, unlike Tejas jets, the production of Prachand helicopters involves comparatively lesser technological complexity and industrial requirements. Also, since the Prachand choppers technologically draw on from the Dhruv helicopter; they therefore share key components such as the rotor system, transmission, engines, and manufacturing infrastructure. This factor also simplifies and speeds up production.
The LCA Tejas program was conceived during 1980s to replace the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) ageing MiG-21 fleet. the LCH Prachand on the other hand was conceived, later – following the Kargil conflict. These were primarily developed for high-altitude warfare in environments such as the Himalayas and the Siachen Glacier. As compared to Tejas, Prachand’s timeline was shorter and these choppers were formally commissioned in 2022. Alongside the Prachands, the HAL also developed armed utility helicopters; the Rudra. Rudras were commissioned even more earlier; in 2012. However, as compared to Rudras, it is the Prachand choppers that better reflect New Delhi’s claim to producing sophisticated combat aviation systems since these are attack helicopters, fielding higher export value and the ability to generate long-term revenues through maintenance and upgrades services.
The LCA Tejas has been facing delays owing to its continued reliance on imported engines, radar systems, and other critical components. This has not only slowed down induction by the Indian military, but has also resulted into the aircraft failing to secure any substantive export orders. In November last year, a Tejas jet crashed during an international airshow in Dubai, reportedly prompting Armenia to suspend its deal with HAL for the procurement of the fighter jet.
In contrast, the profile of Prachand choppers – for both domestic consumption and for exports, appears to be relatively better. Currently operational with the Indian Army and the IAF, these choppers are capable of conducting wide range of missions including counterinsurgency, suppression of enemy air defences, and armoured warfare. They were deployed during the Ladakh standoff to conduct armed patrols from forward air bases on a trial basis too. Furthermore, since the Indian government is placing progressive procurement orders for these choppers, the HAL is now moving toward their scalable production. In March 2025, India’s Ministry of Defence signed two contracts with HAL for 156 systems; 66 for the IAF and 90 for the Army, whereas deliveries are to begin in the third year after contract signing and spread over five years.
This however begs the question that can the LCH Prachand restore HAL’s reputation after the Tejas programme’s troubled journey?
While they are making room for themselves for domestic consumption, they could also be expected to experience relatively better prospects in the international market as compared to the Tejas jets. This is because the international global market for fighter jets is dominated by established manufacturers including the Lockheed Martin, Saab, Dassault Aviation, Northrop Grumman, Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, and Eurofighter among others. As a result, the Tejas jets face intense competition in terms of capability, cost, after-sales support, and in breaking into established logistics networks. The Prachand on the other hand operates on a relatively narrower niche of high-altitude light attack helicopters; a segment characterised by fewer dedicated platforms. In this regards, choppers such as the Eurocopter tigers, AgustaWestland T129 ATAKs, and Changhe Z-10s and Z-19s, produced by established industrial giants would be very strong competitors against Prachand. Prachands, on the other hand may seek to find market in countries such as Armenia, Philippines and Vietnam, which are currently bolstering their strategic defence ties with New Delhi. However, in order to secure markets here, the Prachands would need to ensure competitive pricing.
In addition to this, the HAL nonetheless faces reputational constraints that have already come to be associated with the LCA Tejas programme. To begin with, the operational validation of the system remains relatively limited. While the choppers were deployed during the Ladakh standoff however, their exposure to sustained combat conditions has so far been minimal. This constrained operational record may therefore constitute a limitation in its export appeal, particularly when international procurement decisions often place significant weight on battlefield-proven performance. Furthermore, HAL’s track record in export markets has been mixed, with earlier concerns regarding the Dhruv helicopter influencing perceptions of reliability and maintainability.
Also, the Prachand programme too is not entirely free from foreign dependence. Most importantly, the Shakti-1H1 engines that fuel these choppers are jointly produced by the HAL and French-origin Safran Helicopter engines. In addition to this, while the HAL aims to raise indigenous content of these choppers to 65% in the coming years, as of now the indigenous content of these engines is at mere 45 percent. It is a matter of fact that modern day’s supply chains are indeed deeply intertwined, however, this external reliance brings up an incumbent contingency of introducing a degree of vulnerability. In the event of any unexpected geopolitical disruptions or shifts in strategic alignments, the availability of critical components becomes difficult; a fact that has been quite evident in the aftermath of Russia-Ukraine conflict. Prior to this, the Tejas program itself has been at the receiving end of this dynamic, since it has been experiencing delays in receiving the F-404 IN20 engines manufactured by the U.S-based General Electrics and Active Electronically Scanned Array radars from Israel’s Elta Systems. This becomes a critical challenge since purchasers not only tend to prioritise combat effectiveness but, at the dame also prioritise resilient and foolproof supply chains, long-term maintenance and after-sales support.
To conclude, reputations in the defence sector are built on operational reliability, consistent deliveries, technological innovation, and foolproof export chains. Therefore, in order for the Prachands to survive in international arms markets, they would have to check all these boxes. The platform’s reputation will depend on its performance, as well as capability of HAL to ensure consistent production and timely delivery. Any recurrence of delays and bottlenecks would reinforce existing criticisms that have long surrounded the Tejas project. Induction number are important indicators, however, the platform’s ultimate standing in the international market will be determined by its performance, and its ability to establish a sustained record of reliability, delivery discipline, and customer confidence.
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