Tokyo Was Always a Den of Spies

Tokyo Was Always a Den of Spies

The recent New York Times report describing Japan as a Russian “den of spies” has generated alarm over Moscow’s use of Tokyo as an intelligence and technology-procurement hub. Russian operatives allegedly worked through diplomatic missions, commercial offices and state-controlled enterprises to cultivate sources, obtain restricted components and move equipment through third countries into Russia’s military supply chain. The investigation depicts an extensive operation adapted to sanctions, export controls and the industrial demands of the war in Ukraine. Its broader premise is familiar.

The operation deserves serious attention. The sense of historical novelty surrounding it does not. Japan has served as one of the world’s most important intelligence crossroads since the emergence of the modern Japanese state. Its industrial capacity, strategic geography, close alliance with the United States and proximity to China, Russia and the Korean Peninsula make it one of the richest intelligence targets in Asia. Tokyo offers access to Japanese defense planning, American military deployments, advanced research, sensitive manufacturing and political debates that shape the future of the Indo-Pacific. Russia did not suddenly transform Japan into a haven for spies. It returned to an operating environment that Soviet intelligence had exploited with extraordinary success long before Vladimir Putin entered the Kremlin.

The most famous precedent is Richard Sorge, the Soviet military intelligence officer who built one of the most consequential espionage networks of the twentieth century. Sorge arrived in Japan in 1933 under the cover of a German journalist and committed Nazi. His German citizenship, military service in the First World War and connections to prominent publications gave him credibility inside the German diplomatic community. He developed a close relationship with military attaché and later ambassador Eugen Ott, becoming a trusted analyst and informal adviser on Japanese affairs.

Sorge’s brilliance came from his ability to turn social access into strategic intelligence. German diplomats discussed classified assessments and military planning with him because they regarded him as ideologically reliable and professionally useful. Far from relying solely on stolen papers or clandestine meetings, Sorge made himself indispensable to officials who possessed the information Moscow wanted. Personal friendships, embassy conversations, journalism, and political analysis became instruments of collection.

His network penetrated Japanese policymaking through Hotsumi Ozaki, a respected journalist and adviser with access to Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe’s circle. Ozaki reported on debates inside the Japanese leadership, including the struggle over whether Japan should move north against the Soviet Union or south toward Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Other members gathered political and military information, while radio operator Max Clausen transmitted reports to Moscow. Sorge could compare what German officials believed Japan would do with what Japanese insiders were actually discussing.

The strategic stakes were immense. The Soviet leadership feared that Japan might attack Siberia while Germany advanced from the west. Japan had occupied Manchuria, fought Soviet forces at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, and maintained the powerful Kwantung Army near Soviet territory. A two-front war could have overwhelmed the Soviet Union. Sorge’s access gave Moscow rare insight into the intentions of both Berlin and Tokyo.

In 1941, Sorge warned that Hitler was preparing to violate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and invade the Soviet Union. His reporting joined a flood of warnings from agents, diplomats, military intelligence officers, border commanders and foreign governments. German troop concentrations, railway movements, reconnaissance flights, and operational preparations pointed toward war. Stalin refused to accept the conclusion.

Stalin believed Hitler would avoid opening another front while Britain remained undefeated. He suspected that London was trying to provoke a German-Soviet conflict and treated some warnings as British manipulation. Several earlier reports had offered possible attack dates that passed without an invasion, making it easier for him to dismiss later intelligence. The purges had also devastated Soviet military and intelligence institutions, creating a climate in which officials feared contradicting the dictator’s assumptions.

Germany launched Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. Soviet forces suffered catastrophic losses during the opening months. German aircraft destroyed Soviet planes on the ground, armored formations shattered frontier defenses and entire armies disappeared into encirclements. Stalin’s refusal to act on converging intelligence did not cause Hitler’s invasion, though it magnified the devastation by leaving Soviet commanders confused, unprepared and afraid to respond decisively.

The Sorge episode remains one of history’s clearest demonstrations that excellent intelligence cannot rescue leaders determined to reject it. Moscow possessed a source with remarkable access to German and Japanese decision-making. The Soviet political system filtered his reporting through Stalin’s suspicions, ideological assumptions, and personal authority. Collection succeeded. Judgment failed.

Sorge later reported that Japan planned to move south and would refrain from attacking the Soviet Far East unless Germany first achieved a decisive victory. His assessment helped Moscow reduce its fear of an immediate Japanese offensive and contributed to the transfer of forces toward the defense of Moscow. Other sources supported that conclusion, yet Sorge’s network gave the Kremlin unusually detailed insight into Japanese calculations. Japanese authorities arrested him in October 1941 and executed him in 1944. The Soviet Union refused to acknowledge him publicly until 1964, when it transformed an inconvenient intelligence history into a heroic legend.

Modern Russian operations in Japan preserve many of the same habits. Diplomats, state companies, airlines, media organizations, and trade offices provide cover. Officers approach engineers, businesspeople, researchers and officials through relationships that appear professional or commercial. Legitimate institutions conceal clandestine purposes. Japan’s fragmented counterintelligence system and weak espionage laws have historically reduced the risks for foreign operatives, who may face charges involving trade secrets or export violations rather than espionage itself.

The current mission also reflects the requirements of industrial war. Russia needs semiconductors, sensors, machine tools, optical equipment, electronic components and advanced materials to sustain weapons production. Western sanctions have restricted direct access to many of these products. Russian intelligence services now help identify suppliers, recruit intermediaries, conceal end users, establish payment routes and redirect shipments through countries with weaker enforcement.

A component manufactured in Japan may travel through Southeast Asia or Central Asia, change ownership several times, eventually reaching a Russian defense contractor. Shell companies, freight forwarders, customs brokers, and financial intermediaries can divide the transaction into fragments, allowing each participant to claim ignorance of the final destination. Intelligence officers coordinate the system, locate weaknesses, and protect the people who keep it functioning.

Sorge’s network depended on a small group of highly placed human sources. The present architecture spreads responsibilities across officers, companies, cyber specialists, procurement agents and logistics networks. Digital tools allow services to identify engineers through professional platforms, map their relationships, study their financial pressures and approach them through plausible business opportunities. Cyber operations can steal technical data while procurement networks pursue the physical components. Influence campaigns can discourage stronger counterintelligence laws by portraying every reform as a threat to democratic freedoms.

The Russian presence in Japan also reflects Moscow’s displacement from Europe. European governments expelled hundreds of suspected Russian intelligence officers following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia responded by shifting personnel and activity toward countries where diplomatic and commercial operations remained less constrained. Japan’s technological sophistication, geographic position, and legal gaps made it an obvious target.

The larger question concerns China. If Russia has devoted substantial intelligence resources to Japan while fighting an expensive war in Europe, Beijing almost certainly directs an even broader effort toward the country. China has deeper commercial ties, greater cyber capacity, larger industrial ambitions, and immediate military interests in Japan’s territory and alliance relationships. For Beijing, Japan represents a neighboring military power, a center of advanced technology, a host of crucial American bases, and a potential participant in any conflict over Taiwan.

Chinese intelligence requirements would include Japanese planning for a Taiwan contingency, missile deployments across the southwestern islands, American operations from Okinawa, anti-submarine capabilities, semiconductor policy, undersea infrastructure, space cooperation, and public attitudes toward defense expansion. Chinese services also have reason to target robotics, artificial intelligence, batteries, precision manufacturing, quantum research, and advanced materials.

Beijing can pursue these goals through professional intelligence officers, cyber units, state-owned enterprises, research partnerships, technology licensing arrangements, commercial acquisitions and talent recruitment programs. Academic and business ties create access that may be entirely legitimate until a state-linked actor begins requesting protected data, directing research priorities or pressuring individuals to cooperate. The enormous volume of normal interaction between Japan and China gives covert activity ample room to hide.

Russia and China also have incentives to share selected intelligence. Both want information about American military movements, Japanese defense planning, sanctions enforcement and technology controls. Moscow can offer experience in human intelligence, covert procurement, and clandestine logistics. Beijing can provide commercial reach, financial resources, cyber access, and manufacturing capacity. Shared exercises and growing military coordination create additional opportunities for exchanges involving regional surveillance and alliance activity.

Their cooperation carries a powerful undercurrent of distrust. Russia knows that China seeks Russian military technology, scientific expertise, and influence in the Russian Far East. Beijing has little reason to reveal its most valuable sources to a weaker partner. Each service will guard unilateral access in Japan because exclusive intelligence creates leverage. Moscow fears becoming dependent on China, while Beijing sees little benefit in treating Russia as an equal when economic and political power increasingly favors China.

Japan and its allies can exploit that rivalry by identifying overlapping networks, tracing shared intermediaries, and exposing procurement channels used by both states. Carefully managed disclosures can force Russian and Chinese services to investigate one another, reconsidering trusted contacts and spending resources rebuilding compromised operations. Intelligence sharing among Japan, the US, Britain, Australia and European partners can combine customs records, financial data, cyber indicators, and travel patterns that no government can fully interpret alone.

However, Japan’s response requires going well beyond a new intelligence bureaucracy. Tokyo needs stronger espionage laws, meaningful penalties for covert work on behalf of foreign states, better protection for sensitive research, and direct reporting channels between industry and counterintelligence agencies. Companies producing advanced electronics, machine tools, maritime technology, and aerospace equipment need assistance recognizing recruitment attempts and suspicious export routes. Investigators need the authority and resources to follow Japanese products beyond the first foreign distributor.

The phrase “den of spies” attracted attention because it suggests a startling transformation. Tokyo has always drawn spies because it offers access to the military, technological, and political future of Asia. Russia has returned to Sorge’s terrain with commercial fronts, cyber tools. and international procurement chains designed for the war in Ukraine. The most important question now reaches beyond the Russian activity exposed in the headlines.  Will Putin repeat Stalin’s mistakes and disregard valuable intelligence coming from these networks? Are any of the ongoing operations as brilliant as Sorge’s HUMINT, or, have the painstaking collection and analysis of data by various means displaced the social intelligence required to draw out gems of insight from the cacophony of information?  We may not know the answers to these, and many other questions, for years to come. However, If Moscow has built this much capacity in Japan while burdened by sanctions and war, China’s operation may already be larger, quieter ,and more deeply embedded in the ordinary traffic of Japanese economic and political life. Japan and its allies need to determine how closely the two services cooperate, where they compete, and how their distrust can be turned against them before another strategic warning arrives and political leaders once again decide not to hear it.

Irina Tsukerman

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Irina Tsukerman

Irina Tsukerman is a US national security lawyer and president of the geopolitical risk strategic advisory Scarab Rising, Inc. She is also a board member of The Washington Outsider Center for Information Warfare. Her work and media appearances can be found on her profile.

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