The Middle East is undergoing a significant transformation in its security landscape as tensions between Iran and Israel, shifting regional alliances, and growing competition among global powers reshape the strategic environment. Gulf states are increasingly balancing military deterrence with diplomatic engagement, while maritime security challenges in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb continue to raise concerns over regional stability, energy supplies, and international trade.
In an exclusive interview with Global Defense Insight (GDI), Tyela Shaffan, Strategist and Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the International Islamic University Islamabad, shares her perspectives on the evolving Middle Eastern security architecture. Speaking with Laraib Hassan, she examines Iran-Israel tensions, Saudi-Iran relations, maritime security threats, the expanding roles of the United States and China, and the need for institutionalized regional security cooperation to achieve long-term stability.
How do you assess the changing security architecture of the Middle East following the recent Israel-Iran tensions?
The Middle East is moving from a relatively predictable balance of regional competition toward a more fragmented security environment. The recent Israel-Iran tensions have shown that confrontation is no longer confined to one bilateral relationship; it can involve Gulf states, non-state actors, maritime routes and external powers.
The point of significance is that regional states are increasingly combining deterrence with diplomacy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for example, have strong security relationships with the United States but have also maintained channels with Iran. This suggests that the emerging architecture is likely to be based less on rigid alliances and more on multiple partnerships, strategic hedging and crisis management.
With Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE pursuing rivalry and diplomacy at the same time, do you see this as a new kind of regional balancing, or an old pattern playing out in a more dangerous environment?
This reflects an old balancing logic operating through contemporary diplomatic instruments. These states still compete over influence, security and regional order, but they have become more cautious about allowing competition to turn into sustained confrontation. The Saudi-Iran diplomatic rapprochement, facilitated by China in 2023, is a good example of rivalry being managed alongside dialogue. The difference today is the complexity of the environment. States are simultaneously managing relations with Iran, the United States, China and other regional actors. These states reflect a hedging strategy to remain relevant to the regional order. Therefore, diplomacy is not replacing competition; rather, diplomacy has become part of the balancing strategy itself.
How have the crises at the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb changed the strategic importance of maritime security in the region?
The recent crises have demonstrated that maritime security is no longer simply a naval or commercial issue. Hormuz connects the Gulf’s energy producers with global markets, while Bab el-Mandeb links the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean and wider international trade. Disruption at either chokepoint can therefore create consequences far beyond the immediate region. Recent observations showed frequent falls in trade through Hormuz, while the Bab el-Mandeb has also faced renewed Houthi threats. This has elevated maritime security into a central component of national and economic security. Regional states now must think not only about protecting territorial waters but also about shipping resilience, energy security, alternative routes, intelligence-sharing and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure.
After what we have seen at Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, what lessons should regional states draw about protecting these strategic routes in the future?
The first lesson is that no state can assume that a major maritime chokepoint will remain secure simply because international naval forces are present. Recent attacks demonstrate that relatively limited capabilities, including missiles and drones, can create disproportionate economic and strategic disruption not only in the concerned region but it also poses a spillover effect on other regions as well. More than 100 Houthi attacks on commercial vessels were recorded between November 2023 and October 2025, affecting ships linked to more than 60 countries.
The second lesson is the need for regional maritime cooperation rather than relying entirely on external security providers. States need better information-sharing, maritime surveillance, crisis communication and contingency planning, while also developing alternative infrastructure where geographically possible. The objective should be resilience, because eliminating vulnerability at these chokepoints is extremely difficult.
As the risk of wider escalation grows, what specific shifts are you seeing in how regional powers use military and diplomatic tools together?
One important shift is that military power and diplomacy are increasingly being used simultaneously rather than sequentially. States may strengthen air and missile defence, increase military readiness or deepen security partnerships while keeping diplomatic channels open with potential adversaries. This allows them to signal deterrence without necessarily closing the door to de-escalation.
The world is also observing greater emphasis on limited signalling and calibrated responses. Regional powers understand that a direct confrontation can rapidly affect energy markets, investment, trade and domestic stability. Diplomacy therefore functions not simply as an alternative to military power, but as a mechanism for controlling the risks created by military competition.
With the US maintaining its security role and China expanding its economic and diplomatic presence, how do you think great-power competition will reshape the regional order going forward?
The Middle East is not simply moving from an American-led order to a Chinese-led order. The more likely development is a more diversified regional order, in which Gulf states continue to depend on American security capabilities while simultaneously expanding economic, technological and diplomatic relations with China. China’s role in facilitating the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement demonstrated that Beijing’s regional role is no longer purely economic.
For regional states, this creates both opportunities and constraints. They can diversify partnerships and gain greater strategic autonomy, but they also have to avoid becoming unnecessarily caught between competing great powers. The Middle East is engaging with other regional powers for security cooperation. Additionally, the central feature of the emerging order may therefore be strategic flexibility rather than exclusive alignment.
Looking beyond the current conflicts, what do you consider the most important challenge to achieving long-term stability in the Middle East?
The major challenge is the absence of a durable regional security mechanism capable of managing competition before it becomes conflict. The region has individual diplomatic initiatives and bilateral arrangements, but there is still no comprehensive framework that brings the major regional powers together to address issues such as maritime security, missiles, proxy conflicts, territorial disputes and crisis communication.
Long-term stability therefore requires moving beyond temporary de-escalation toward institutionalised dialogue and confidence-building. Military deterrence will remain important, but deterrence alone cannot produce regional stability. The real challenge is creating an environment where states can compete without constantly fearing that competition will escalate into another major conflict.
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ToggleLaraib Hassan
Laraib Hassan is pursuing Bachelors in International Relations from International Islamic University, Islamabad.



