War as described by Clausewitz is a continuation of policy by other means. What he could not have foreseen is that in the 21st century, those means would expand across multiple domains, i.e. land, air, sea, space, cyber, and the cognitive battlefield of information collapsing the distinction between peacetime and conflict, between the front line and the homeland.
Multi-Domain Operations, or MDO, is not a synonym for joint warfare. Classical joint operations integrated the services toward a shared objective. In MDO’s, every domain works in coherence with other each other, where effects created in one domain create and exploit advantages in other domains. The main goal of MDO is to overwhelm or disrupt the enemy’s decision-making cycle to gain an advantage. The US Army’s TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, defines MDO as the convergence of capabilities across all domains and the information environment to overcome an adversary’s strengths. The crucial distinction from joint warfare lies in the word coherence or coordination. Previous operational concepts were sequential. First, establish air superiority, then move ground forces, then consolidate. MDO changes this sequence entirely by overwhelming an adversary’s adaptation capacity before he can respond coherently. Effects in one domain are deliberately designed to create advantages in others. For example, the cyber-attack that degrades an air defense network enables the strike package that would otherwise face unacceptable attrition. The drone swarm over a capital city constrains political leadership from calibrating a measured response while conventional engagements are still ongoing.
Germany’s campaign against France in WW2 can be said as the first demonstration of multi domain operations. Guderian’s Panzers advanced in constant coordination with the Luftwaffe, designed to destroy the enemy’s decision-making cycle faster than they could adapt. John Boyd’s OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) formalized this insight, i.e. war is fundamentally a competition in decision making speed. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 validated it when coalition air force rendered Iraqi command and control inert within seventy-two hours. Ukraine since 2022 has normalized the concept. Commercial satellites, armed drones, and electronic warfare have created a battlefield where MDO is no longer the exclusive province of superpowers with defense budgets of billions of dollars.
May 2025 Crises: South Asia’s First Multi-Domain War
The concept of MDO arrived in Indo-Pak case in the age of nuclear deterrence. The two states inhabit what strategists call the stability instability paradox i.e nuclear weapons provide strategic stability at the highest level while simultaneously enabling instability below it, because both actors know that conventional escalation is bounded by the nuclear ceiling. In this grey zone left at the lower level, precision missiles, cyber-attacks, drone swarms and information warfare are the tools to inflict damage without crossing the nuclear red line. Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence doctrine and India’s Cold Start Doctrine concept were both designed to exploit and counter this grey zone. India under Cold Start Doctrine seeking rapid limited gains before nuclear considerations became operative, Pakistan deploying tactical nuclear weapons to lower its threshold and deter that outcome.
May 2025 crises saw South Asia’s first Multi Domain Warfighting. On April 22nd, 2025, a group of terrorists attacked tourists visiting Pahalgam, a hill station located in Indian Administered Kashmir resulting in the death of 26 tourists. This incident became the flashpoint of the escalation as India accused Pakistan of cross border terrorism and supporting The Resistance Front (TRF), the group which initially claimed responsibility for the attack. India suspended Indus Water Treaty on April 23rd. Pakistan denied these accusations and retaliated by suspending Simla Agreement restricting trade and then by the closure of its air space for Indian flights. This escalation was followed by a border standoff between the two countries.
On the night of May 6th Indian military struck civilian infrastructure in multiple cities of Pakistan dubbing it as precision strikes on terrorist infrastructure. Pakistani Jets (J-10C and JF-17) then intercepted IAF planes downing several of them while suffering 0 losses. India launched Operation Sindoor on May7th. It was a tri-service campaign which saw India using drones for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) to locate Pakistan’s air defense installations. India in later phases used loitering munitions, missiles along with electronic warfare suites and space-based targeting. Pakistan’s response, Operation Bunyan ul Marsoos, was equally multi-domain. Beyond-visual-range (BVR)aerial engagements, Fateh-1 rocket strikes on Indian military infrastructure, drone swarms demonstrated over Indian cities including the capital, and cyber operations targeting critical Indian infrastructure. The episode lasted until 10th May when both sides agreed to a cease fire brokered by the USA. What it demonstrated was the compression of escalation ladders that had previously given diplomacy room to operate. Cyber and information domain effects had begun before the physical strikes. Space-based surveillance provided real-time battle pictures and damage assessment. Drone operations over capital cities created strategic-level psychological effects while engagements were still ongoing.
The Future of Warfare in South Asia
Evident from the May 2025 crisis, several structural trends will shape conflict in South Asia, and none of them point toward simplification. Artificial intelligence is already compressing the OODA loop to a point where political leaders may lose meaningful control over escalation in real time. Drone proliferation has created a permanent feature of the battlespace. Swarm tactics and saturation of air defenses will become standard. The deepening importance of space-based intelligence and the looming question of anti-satellite capabilities add further complexity. Most consequentially, Pakistan’s possible acquisition of the J-35 stealth fighter and the establishment of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC) with China have introduced a trilateral dimension that Indian planners can no longer treat as a secondary consideration.
India’s Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018 emphasized simultaneity over sequential phasing, and from it emerged the Cold Strike concept. Small, battle ready, multi domain formations capable of precision operations not after mobilizing, but while mobilizing. The Rudra Brigade, validated in Exercise Akhand Prahar in November 2025, is the sharpest instrument of this approach. Pakistan’s Raad ul Fatah exercise was designed around offensive defense to pre-empt and disrupt rapid Indian action, backed by the Fateh-1 guided rocket system and an expanding precision drone capability. These measures along with many more adopted by both the countries Post May 2025 Crises highlight the shift of both nuclear armed adversaries towards multi domain operations but the introduction of these very MDOs in South Asia’s strategic equation has disturbed its balance.
The stability-instability paradox that has governed South Asian security since 1998 rests on the assumption that both states can manage escalation deliberately, that recognizable thresholds exist, and that political leaders retain meaningful control at all times. Multi Domain Operations challenge all three assumptions. The cyber domain has no established red lines. Drone swarms over capital cities generate domestic pressure on political leadership and can overwhelm strategic caution. The nuclear deterrent does not lose its validity in this environment, but its stabilizing function is significantly more fragile than South Asian strategic discourse has traditionally acknowledged. MDO’s have been adapted by Pakistan and India both, however these MDO’s have made the future of warfare uncertain. MDO’s exploit the limited warfare threshold left due to Stability Instability Paradox but in a sensitive and fragile region as South Asia MDO’s have the potential to escalate a limited future conflict into a full-scale war.

Muhammad Shaheer
Muhammad Shaheer is an undergraduate student of Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad, with academic interests in missile technologies and military modernization.



